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Summary
Decarbonizing the U.S. energy system will require a pro-
gram of building onshore wind, offshore wind, utility-scale 
solar, and associated transmission that will exceed what has 
been done before in the United States by many times, every 
year out to 2050. These facilities, together with rooftop 
photovoltaics and other distributed generation, are required 
to replace most fossil fuel generation and to help furnish 
the added electricity that will be needed as many uses cur-
rently employing fossil fuels (especially passenger transpor-
tation and space and water heating) are electrified. This 
Article, excerpted from Michael B. Gerrard & John Dern-
bach, eds., Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the 
United States (ELI Press forthcoming 2018), discusses the 
four most important legal processes and obstacles involved 
in this enormous project: site acquisition and approval; the 
National Environmental Policy Act; state and local approv-
als; and species protection laws. It also presents recom-
mendations for lowering the obstacles and briefly discusses 
several corollary actions that are needed.
I. Introduction
Achieving the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 
(DDPP) scenarios1 to decarbonize the U.S. energy system 
will require a program of building onshore wind, offshore 
wind, utility-scale solar,2 and associated transmission that 
is not only unprecedented—it will exceed what has been 
done before in the United States by many times, every year 
out to 2050.
This Article will discuss the four most important legal 
processes and obstacles involved in this enormous project: 
site acquisition and approval; the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA); state and local approvals; and species 
protection laws. It will also present recommendations for 
lowering the obstacles, and it will briefly discuss several 
corollary actions that are also needed.
These problems are not unique to the United States. A 
2016 study from the International Energy Agency found 
that large renewable projects in France, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom have also been plagued in varying degrees 
by delays from political/regulatory issues, site access, envi-
ronmental approvals, and grid connection.3
Approval delays are costly in several ways. Construc-
tion costs may escalate. New technologies or require-
ments may compel a revision in designs, leading to 
further delays. Applicants may become so discouraged by 
the delays that they give up, or their financing may van-
ish, or local opposition to siting may grow. Lenders who 
require speedy returns may be deterred from engaging at 
all. During the years that a renewable facility is not yet 
operating, the energy needs it will fill may be provided 
by fossil fuel facilities that add to the cumulative load of 
greenhouse gases.
After quantifying the number of facilities needed, this 
Article discusses each of the four principal processes in 
turn. First, however, it is appropriate to introduce NEPA,4 
since it is so pervasive in what follows. NEPA requires fed-
1. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project is a global consortium of 
researchers working on practical methods to deeply reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in their own countries. See http://deepdecarbonization.org/.
2. Utility-scale facilities are typically stand-alone and are designed to provide 
power to the electric grid. They are in contrast to distributed facilities, 
which are often attached to buildings and are designed to help power those 
buildings and perhaps the immediate community, though they sometimes 
sell excess power to the grid.
3. International Energy Agency’s Implementing Agreement for 
Renewable Energy Technology Deployment, Final Report: 
Documenting the Cost of Regulatory Delays (Re-Delays) (2016), 
available at http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RE-DELAYS-
final-report.pdf.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.
Author’s Note: The author thanks the following reviewers for their 
comments on earlier drafts: David Cleaves, John Dernbach, David 
Hayes, Michael Hindus, Ryan Jones, Yael Lifshitz, Ethan Shenkman, 
Eleanor Stein, and Edward Strohbehn.
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eral agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) for any major federal action significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment . Utility-scale proj-
ects on federal land, or offshore, almost invariably require 
an EIS . The NEPA process can go on for several years and 
cost millions of dollars, and it often leads to litigation that 
can take still more years .
As discussed below, recent legal and administra-
tive reforms have shown promise in shortening NEPA 
time lines and reducing litigation for renewable energy 
projects, but the field remains challenging . Several 
related actions may be considered together in a “pro-
grammatic” EIS, sometimes (but not always) followed 
by narrower site-specific EIS or environmental assess-
ments; this “tiering” process has the potential to reduce 
duplicated effort .5
It must also be noted that the Donald Trump Adminis-
tration is moving to rescind a large number of environmen-
tal regulations and guidance documents, especially those 
adopted during the Barack Obama Administration . The 
Trump Administration is clearly very favorable toward fos-
sil fuel development; its attitudes toward renewable energy 
development remain to be seen . Readers are cautioned to 
ensure that any federal regulations or orders referenced 
here are still in effect .
II. The Massive Number of 
Needed Facilities
The DDPP scenarios all call for the construction of a 
massive number of new central station renewable energy 
facilities, mostly wind and solar—many times higher 
than the amount of such construction ever previously 
achieved . These are required to replace most fossil fuel 
generation and to help furnish the added electricity that 
will be needed as many uses currently employing fossil 
fuels (especially passenger transportation and space and 
water heating) are electrified . (Some of this needed capac-
ity could be met instead by small-scale distributed units, 
mostly rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar ther-
mal .) All of this is in addition to aggressive programs of 
energy efficiency and, possibly, expanded use of nuclear 
energy and hydropower .
The amount of energy produced in the United States 
from wind and solar sources has been rapidly increasing, as 
shown in Table 1 .
5 . 40 C .F .R . §1508 .28 . This was successfully done by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) in the Dry Lake, Nevada, solar energy zone . Because 
of the programmatic EIS for the zone, three large projects were able to move 
forward in less than 10 months under tiered environmental assessments . Press 
Release, U .S . Department of the Interior, Interior Department Approves First 
Solar Energy Zone Projects (Apr . 26, 2016), available at https://www .doi .gov/
pressreleases/interior-department-approves-first-solar-energy-zone-projects .
Table 1 
U.S. Net Electricity Generation6
Thousands Megawatt (MW) Hours
Year Wind Solar PV
Utility Scale
Solar Thermal
Utility Scale
Solar PV
Distributed
2006 26,589 15 493 N/A
2007 34,450 16 596 N/A
2008 55,363 76 788 N/A
2009 73,886 157 735 N/A
2010 94,652 423 789 N/A
2011 120,177 1,012 806 N/A
2012 140,822 3,451 876 N/A
2013 167,840 8,121 915 N/A
2014 181,655 15,250 2,441 11,233
2015 190,719 21,666 3,227 14,139
2016 226,485 33,367 3,388 19,467
In 2016, wind and solar amounted to 6 .9% of U .S . 
electricity generation .7 By 2050, this will need to go up 
to 50 .25% under the DDPP Mixed Scenario and 78 .0% 
under the DDPP High Renewables Scenario, as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 .8
Table 2 
Percentage of U.S. Electricity Generation— 
DDPP Mixed Scenario
Year Onshore Wind Offshore Wind Solar PV
2016* 5.50 0 1.30
2020 8.41 0.03 0.62
2030 18.09 1.38 1.11
2040 27.04 4.44 3.27
2050 31.56 7.59 11.10
* Actuals9
Table 3 
Percentage of U.S. Electricity Generation—
DDPP High Renewables Scenario
Year Onshore Wind Offshore Wind Solar PV
2016* 5.50 0 1.30
2020 9.57 0.03 1.12
2030 26.14 4.28 4.64
2040 45.30 7.18 7.93
2050 51.57 10.89 15.54
* Actuals
6 . U .S . Energy Information Administration (EIA), Electric Power 
Monthly With Data for February 2017 tbls . 1 .1 and 1 .1 .A (2007) 
[hereinafter Electric Power Monthly], available at https://www .eia .gov/
electricity/monthly/pdf/epm .pdf .
7 . Id .
8 . Source: Personal Communication with Ben Haley, DDPP (Aug . 29, 2016) .
9 . Source of actuals: Electric Power Monthly, supra note 6, tbls . 1 .1 and 
1 .1 .A . Excluded is the very small amount of electricity generated by the 
Rhode Island offshore wind facility that opened on Dec . 12, 2016 .
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Tables 1, 2, and 3 show electricity generation—the elec-
tricity that is actually generated . The amount of new gen-
erating capacity added each year—the amount of electricity 
that could be generated if the units were running all the 
time—has fluctuated considerably for wind (not solar), due 
mostly to the expiration and renewal cycles for federal tax 
credits . This is shown in Table 4 .
Table 4 
U.S. Renewable Energy Nameplate 
Net Capacity Added (MW)10
Year Onshore Wind Solar PV*
2004 372 58
2005 2,396 79
2006 2,454 105
2007 5,237 160
2008 8,425 298
2009 9,919 382
2010 5,112 852
2011 6,649 1,925
2012 13,089 3,372
2013 1,102 4,761
2014 4,772 6,247
2015 8,113 7,260
* Grid connected only; reported in MW direct
current (MWdc)
The amounts of new generation capacity added each 
year under the DDPP Mixed Scenario and DDPP High 
Renewables Scenario are presented in Tables 5 and 6 .11 As 
these tables show, the amount of new capacity that will 
need to be added each year must be many times higher 
than what has been achieved in prior years .
Table 5 
Annual Capacity Additions (MW)—
DDPP Mixed Scenario
Year Onshore Wind Offshore Wind Solar PV
2014* 4,772 0 6,201**
2020 9,606 333 1,294
2025 16,448 1,689 3,996
2030 23,689 3,682 10,788
2035 26,551 7,921 12,149
2040 27,863 8,728 15,092
2045 18,137 17,485 20,524
2050 13,913 12,273 42,857
* Actuals
** Grid connected only
10 . U .S . Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2015 Renewable Energy Data Book 22 (2016), available at http://www .
nrel .gov/docs/fy17osti/66591 .pdf .
11 . Source: Personal Communication with Ben Haley, DDPP (Aug . 26, 2016) .
Table 6 
Annual Capacity Additions (MW)—
DDPP High Renewables Scenario
Year Onshore Wind Offshore Wind Solar PV
2014* 4,772 0 6,201**
2020 10,462 304 1,311
2025 29,813 4,770 7,040
2030 39,625 14,323 19,074
2035 61,343 2,606 20,379
2040 66,584 0 24,751
2045 54,105 20,532 40,331
2050 51,305 13,578 66,502
* Actuals
** Grid connected only
Table 7 compares the electric generating capacity from 
wind and solar PV that actually existed in 2016 to what 
is projected for 2050 under the DDPP Mixed and High 
Renewables Scenarios; the Energy Information Admin-
istration’s (EIA’s) 2017 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 
reference case (which assumes that the statutes and regu-
lations of 2016 remain in place, that known technologies 
will improve, and that economic and demographic trends 
continue); and the U .S . Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 
Wind Vision report . The table starkly shows the order of 
magnitude-scale increases that will be needed over current 
capacity, and the large increases needed beyond DOE’s 
projections for 2050 .
Table 7 
U.S. Electric Generating Capacity (MW)
Scenario Onshore 
Wind
Offshore 
Wind
Solar PV 
2016 actual 81,260 30a 19,380
2050: DDPP Mixedb 725,382 186,802 488,539
2050: DDPP High
Renewables
1,373,372 313,208 800,267
2050: EIA AEO 2017
reference casec
156,300 30,000 148,000d
2050: DOE Wind
Visione
318,000 86,000 —
a. Deepwater Wind, Block Island Wind Farm, http://dwwind.com/project/
block-island-wind-farm/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
b. The DDPP figures were derived from printouts depicting annual 
capacity additions under each scenario, provided by Ben Haley of 
Evolved Energy Research. The figures represent capacity additions 
for 2015 through 2050. The table assumes that all the capacity that 
existed prior to 2015 is retired by 2050, and it does not assume any 
other retirements.
c. EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2017—Table: Renewable Energy Generating 
Capacity and Generation [hereinafter Annual Energy Outlook 2017 Table], 
http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=16-AEO2017&c
ases=ref2017&sourcekey=0 (last visited May 1, 2017).
d. This figure does not include off-grid PV.
e. DOE, WinD VisiOn: A nEW ErA fOr WinD POWEr in thE UnitED stAtEs 
xxxiii, fig. ES.1-3 (2015) (DOE/GO-102015-4557) [hereinafter DOE, 
WinD VisiOn].
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will increase the production, transmission or conserva-
tion of energy .”16 However, the order did not distinguish 
between fossil and renewable energy . In 2002, BLM issued 
an interim wind energy policy,17 and in 2005, it issued a 
programmatic EIS on wind development, as further dis-
cussed below . In 2004 and 2007, BLM issued policies on 
solar development .18 BLM has also taken other actions on 
geothermal energy .19
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 devoted one sentence to 
the subject:
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior 
should, before the end of the 10-year period beginning on 
the date of enactment of this Act, seek to have approved 
non-hydro-power renewable energy projects located on 
the public lands with a generation capacity of at least 
10,000 megawatts of electricity .20
However, the U .S . Congress did not confer any addi-
tional authority on BLM, or alter the approval procedures 
that BLM must use .
By the time Obama became president in January 2009, 
BLM had approved only 566 MW of wind generation 
and no solar energy projects on public lands .21 However, 
in March 2009, his Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, 
issued a Secretarial Order establishing renewable energy 
development as a priority for DOI . Secretary Salazar 
implemented a series of permitting reforms to improve and 
accelerate the review and permitting process for utility-
scale projects on public lands .22 The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the stimulus legislation) 
played an important role by providing expanded tools 
to help renewable energy developers obtain financing for 
their projects .
As a result of these efforts, BLM achieved the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005’s goal of authorizing more than 10,000 
MW of renewable energy on public lands in 2012, three 
16 . Exec . Order No . 13212, 66 Fed . Reg . 28357 (May 22, 2001), Actions to 
Expedite Energy-Related Projects .
17 . Instruction Memorandum No . 2003-020 from BLM, to All Field Officials, 
on Interim Wind Energy Development Policy (Oct . 16, 2002), available at 
http://windeis .anl .gov/documents/docs/IM2003-020,InterimWindEnergy
DevelopmentPolicy .htm .
18 . Instruction Memorandum No . 2005-006 from BLM, to All Field Officials, 
on Solar Energy Development Policy (Oct . 20, 2004), available at https://
www .doi .gov/sites/doi .gov/files/archive/news/archive/04_News_Releases/
solar .pdf; Instruction . Memorandum No . 2007-097 from BLM, to All Field 
Officials, on Solar Energy Development Policy (Apr . 4, 2007), available at 
https://www .blm .gov/policy/im-2007-097 .
19 . See BLM Geologist Sean Hagerty, Presentation at Geothermal Energy 
Leasing on BLM Managed Lands, Geothermal Resource Council 2014 
Pre-Meeting Workshop (Sept . 24, 2014), https://geothermal .org/Annual_
Meeting/PDFs/1%2009 .55%20%20Leasing%20of%20Federal%20Lands . 
%20HAGERTY,%20BLM .pdf .
20 . Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub . L . No . 109-58, §211, 199 Stat . 594 .
21 . Jennifer A . Diouhy, Obama Rule Could Take Wind Out of Renewable Power 
on Public Land, Bloomberg Markets, Aug . 22, 2016, https://www .
bloomberg .com/news/articles/2016-08-22/obama-rule-could-take-wind- 
out-of-renewable-power-on-public-land .
22 . See David J . Hayes et al ., Stanford Law School, A 21st Century 
Governance Challenge: Finding Effective Mechanisms to Address 
Climate Change Across the Federal Government 40-55 (2015), 
available at https://www-cdn .law .stanford .edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
04/SLS-Climate-Chg-Governance-Report .pdf .
III. Site Acquisition and Approval
Large solar and wind projects require a considerable 
amount of land .12 When land that is suitable for a large 
facility is privately owned and its owner is willing to sell 
or lease, few novel legal issues arise . This is a conventional 
real estate transaction, though for large projects, it may 
be necessary to acquire title or easements from multiple 
landowners, which can lead to difficult negotiations and 
sometimes holdout problems . However, three important 
kinds of sites invoke complicated legal processes that can 
engender years of delays: federal land, especially the vast 
tracts in the western deserts that could accommodate large 
solar arrays; offshore areas, which have enormous potential 
for wind farms; and contaminated or otherwise disturbed 
land . This section describes the legal issues for these kinds 
of sites, together with recommendations .
A. Federal Land
The federal government controls vast amounts of 
land . The process for designating some of this use for 
utility-scale wind and solar projects has been complex 
and lengthy .
Most pertinently here, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), part of the U .S . Department of the Interior (DOI), 
controls approximately 248 million surface acres of federal 
land, nearly all of it located in 11 western states and Alaska . 
The U .S . Forest Service, part of the U .S . Department of 
Agriculture, controls 193 million surface acres of forests 
and grasslands, primarily in western states and Alaska, but 
also throughout the country .13 BLM has identified 20 .6 
million acres of its land with wind potential, and 19 mil-
lion with solar potential .14 The Forest Service, while not 
adding up the acreage, has identified 99 National Forest 
Units with potential for wind, solar, or both .15
Efforts to site wind and solar facilities on federal lands 
emerged, at first slowly, in the 2000s . In May 2001, Presi-
dent George W . Bush issued an Executive Order directing 
federal agencies “to take appropriate actions, to the extent 
consistent with applicable law, to expedite projects that 
12 . See Paul Denholm et al ., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
Land-Use Requirements of Modern Wind Power Plants in the 
United States (2009) (NREL/TP-6A2-45834); Sean Ong et al ., 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Land-Use Requirements 
for Solar Power Plants in the United States (2013) (NREL/TP-
6A20-56290); Vasilis Fthenakis & Hyung Chui Kim, Land Use and 
Electricity Generation: A Life-Cycle Analysis, 13 Renewable & Sustainable 
Energy Revs . 1465 (2009); Nathan F . Jones & Liba Pejchar, Comparing the 
Ecological Impacts of Wind and Oil & Gas Development: A Landscape Scale 
Assessment, 8 PLoS ONE 1 (2013) .
13 . U .S . Government Accountability Office (GAO), Renewable Energy: 
Agencies Have Taken Steps Aimed at Improving the Permitting 
Process for Development on Federal Lands 4 (2013) (GAO-13-189) 
[hereinafter GAO, Renewable Energy Report] .
14 . BLM, Renewable Energy: New Energy for America, https://www .blm .gov/
programs/energy-and-minerals/renewable-energy (last visited May 11, 
2017) .
15 . U .S . Forest Service & National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
Assessing the Potential for Renewable Energy on National Forest 
System Lands (2005) (NREL/BK-710-36759) .
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(FLPMA),30 first enacted in 1976 . Specifically, under Title 
V of FLPMA, permits to lease BLM land for wind or solar 
purposes are treated as linear rights-of-way, based on the 
19th century practices for building roads and railways .31 
These permits are temporary conveyances that may readily 
be modified or terminated, and offer less security than the 
leases held by oil, gas, and coal companies .
The Forest Service operates under the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA),32 which allows the Service to 
grant “special use authorizations” for uses other than road 
usage, grazing and livestock use, sale and disposal of tim-
ber and other forest products, and mineral usage .33 Among 
the permitted authorizations are “permits, leases and ease-
ments  .   .   . for rights-of-way for  .   .   . systems and related 
facilities for generation, transmission and distribution of 
electric energy,”34 which would authorize wind or solar 
generation facilities .
Both FLPMA and the NFMA require the agencies 
to develop land use plans for the areas they manage . All 
approved projects must be consistent with those plans, 
and if they are not, the plans must be revised . Revising 
the plans is an arduous process that requires compliance 
with NEPA, among other laws . Each solar project has typi-
cally required its own EIS under NEPA, while some wind 
projects merely require environmental assessments, which 
tends to save more than one year .35
BLM has gotten much faster at navigating this process . 
A 2013 study by the U .S . Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found that solar and wind applications sub-
mitted in 2006 took an average of 3 .9 years to process; 
applications submitted in 2009 took 1 .5 years .36
As noted above, Secretary Salazar instituted new envi-
ronmental review procedures in 2009 that accelerated the 
permitting of renewable energy projects on BLM lands . 
DOI retooled an ongoing solar energy programmatic 
EIS to institute additional permitting reforms through 
its so-called Western Solar Plan . More specifically, BLM 
developed a template in the programmatic EIS for “solar 
energy zones” that, because of lessened environmental 
conflicts and other attractive features (e .g ., locations near 
transmission), should be preferred for solar development .37 
Applying the template, BLM identified 19 solar energy 
zones encompassing 285,000 acres in Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah, and antici-
pated that more solar energy zones would be created in 
30 . 43 U .S .C . §§1701-1785 .
31 . Id. §§1761 et seq . See also Adam Vann, Congressional Research Service, 
Energy Projects on Federal Lands: Leasing and Authorization 
(2012) (7-5700), available at https://fas .org/sgp/crs/misc/R40806 .pdf .
32 . 16 U .S .C . §§1600-1687 .
33 . 36 C .F .R . §251 .50(a) .
34 . Id . §251 .53(l)(4) .
35 . GAO, Renewable Energy Report, supra note 13, at 17-18 .
36 . Id . at 19 .
37 . David J . Hayes, Thinking Big, Envtl . F ., Nov ./Dec . 2013; BLM, Final Solar 
Energy Development Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(2012), available at http://solareis .anl .gov/documents/fpeis/index .cfm .
years ahead of schedule .23 As of December 2016, BLM had 
approved 30 solar projects, of which 11 were in operation 
and seven were under construction; and it had approved 11 
wind projects, of which four were in operation .24 A num-
ber of DOI’s permitting reforms were then adopted by the 
Obama Administration and, importantly, codified in law 
under the FAST Act, discussed below .
The future is uncertain . President Obama’s Climate 
Action Plan called for the permitting of at least 20,000 
MW on public lands by 2020 .25 Hillary Clinton’s presi-
dential campaign posted a position paper pledging to 
“reform leasing and expand clean energy production on 
public lands and waters tenfold within a decade .” During 
his campaign, Trump strongly favored new infrastructure 
construction, but appeared to be much more favorable to 
fossil fuels than renewables, and he expressed some antag-
onism to wind projects . On March 28, 2017, President 
Trump issued an Executive Order rescinding the Climate 
Action Plan .26
As of December 2016, approximately 5,000 MW of 
wind and solar capacity operate on public lands .27 (There 
was one facility in the water—the Rhode Island project 
discussed below .) At that time, the total amount of wind 
capacity in the United States (on all kinds of land) was 
81,260 MW; the total amount of solar PV was 19,380 
MW .28 How will we get to the 912,184 MW total wind 
that the DDPP reports indicated will be needed by 2050 
in the Mixed Scenario, and the 1,686,580 MW total wind 
in the High Renewables Scenario (recognizing that much 
of this will be on private land)?
The needed increases in renewable generation may 
require—and would certainly be helped by—changes in 
the legal model for making public land available .
Special statutory leasing processes exist for oil and gas 
production, and for geothermal production . In 2005, Con-
gress mandated special environmental review and leasing 
processes for oil shale and tar sands .29 However, Congress 
has adopted no special rules for wind or solar siting on fed-
eral lands . Instead, wind and solar siting on BLM land is 
covered by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
23 . Hearing on S.279, Public Land Renewable Energy Development Act of 2013, 
Before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee 1 (2004) (testimony 
of Neil Kornze, Director, BLM) .
24 . BLM, Renewable Energy Data, https://www .blm .gov/programs/energy-and-
minerals/renewable-energy/data (last visited May 11, 2017) .
25 . Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action 
Plan 7 (2013), available at https://www .whitehouse .gov/sites/default/files/
image/president27sclimateactionplan .pdf .
26 . Exec . Order No . 13783, 82 Fed . Reg . 16093 (Mar . 31, 2017) .
27 . Calculated from the maximum capacity of all the facilities listed as operational, 
plus the 566 MW listed as having been approved prior to 2009, on this 
website as viewed in December 2016: http://www .blm .gov/wo/st/en/prog/
energy/renewable_energy/Renewable_Energy_Projects_Approved_to_Date .
html . This number may be high because it is not clear if all 566 MW of 
the capacity approved prior to 2009 was actually built, or whether all the 
approved units have been built to full capacity . (Author’s Note: It has not been 
possible to update these figures because when the BLM website was checked 
on April 9, 2017, it was no longer available .)
28 . Annual Energy Outlook 2017 Table, supra Table 7, note c . The solar PV figure 
does not include off-grid PV, which is not reported .
29 . Oil Shale, Tar Sands, and Other Strategic Unconventional Fuels Act of 
2005, Pub . L . No . 109-58, §1169, 119 Stat . 594, 728 .
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the future .38 It also amended 89 FLPMA land use plans to 
allow solar projects .39
Several environmental groups challenged the EIS on the 
grounds that there had been insufficient consideration of 
distributed generation and of building on disturbed lands, 
but the court upheld the EIS .40 Because this EIS looked 
at the sorts of impacts a solar project could have in this 
region, individual solar projects in one of the solar energy 
zones did not require their own EIS, and they and associ-
ated transmission lines otherwise enjoyed expedited pro-
cessing . (Outside of these zones, another 19 million acres 
are designated as “variance areas”; projects there must go 
through individual procedures .41) The first three projects 
to go through the new process, all in the Dry Lake solar 
energy zone in Nevada, got through the BLM process in 
less than 10 months . BLM also required funding for long-
term desert tortoise monitoring, post-construction moni-
toring of impacts on bird and bats, and measures to reduce 
visual impacts .42
The process does not assure approval . In November 
2014, BLM rejected an application to build a 200-MW 
solar facility in the Mojave Desert, finding that the project 
could disturb important natural and cultural resources .43
A somewhat similar process—which culminated with 
a BLM record of decision in September 2016 after eight 
years of work—was undertaken jointly by BLM, the U .S . 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the state of Cali-
fornia to develop the Desert Renewable Energy Conserva-
tion Plan . It designated multiple uses and protections for 
a 22 .5-million area portion of the California desert . Of 
this, 388,000 acres were designated for renewable energy 
development—a far lower amount than the solar indus-
try had sought .44 Solar developers may now apply to build 
projects on this acreage .
BLM has made a bit less progress with wind than with 
solar . In June 2005, BLM completed a programmatic EIS 
for wind projects in the western states, and amended 52 
38 . BLM, Solar Energy Zones, http://blmsolar .anl .gov/sez/ (last updated Jan . 
10, 2014); Breaking the Logjam at BLM: Examining Ways to More Efficiently 
Process Permits for Energy Production on Federal Lands: Hearing Before the 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 6 (2014) (testimony of 
Arthur Haubenstock, Solar Energy Industries Association); David J . Hayes 
& Nidhi Thakar, Center for American Progress, A 4-Point Plan for 
Responsibly Expanding Renewable Energy Production on America’s 
Public Lands and Oceans (2015), available at http://www .ourenergypolicy .
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/RenewableEnergy-report1 .pdf .
39 . GAO, Renewable Energy Report, supra note 13, at 23 .
40 . Western Lands Project v . Bureau of Land Mgmt ., No . 13-cv-339, 44 ELR 
20143 (S .D . Cal . June 25, 2014), aff’d, 668 F . App’x 802 (9th Cir . 2016) .
41 . Haubenstock testimony, supra note 38, at 6 .
42 . Scott Streater, Interior OKs First Solar Projects Through Streamlined Reviews, 
E&E News, June 1, 2015 .
43 . Carolyn Whetzel, California Desert Solar Project Could Disturb Resources, 
BLM Says in Rejecting Application, Daily Env’t Rep . (BNA), Nov . 14, 
2014, at A-5 .
44 . BLM, Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan Record of 
Decision (2016) (BLM/CA/PL-2016/03+1793+8321), available at http://
www .drecp .org/finaldrecp/rod/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ROD .pdf; Chris 
Mooney, The Government Just Decided the Future of California’s Desert, 
and Solar Companies Aren’t Happy, Wash . Post, Sept . 14, 2016 . See also 
Nathaniel Logar, When the Fast Track Hits the Off Ramp: Renewable Energy 
Permitting and Legal Resistance on Western Public Lands, 27 Colo . Nat . 
Resources, Energy & Envtl . L . Rev . 361 (2017) .
FLPMA plans . It identified 20,634,000 acres as “poten-
tially developable” for wind, but only 160,000 acres as 
“economically developable,” based on access to and costs 
of transmission capacity, the intermittency of wind power, 
wind technology developments, and potential barriers to 
wind resource development . The EIS did not map those 
areas, and no wind energy zones have been designated .45 
BLM has, however, proposed some wind development 
areas in several resource management plans, which govern 
particular BLM units .46
In December 2016, BLM issued its final rule to create 
a competitive lease process for solar and wind energy on 
federal land .47 It favors development in “designated leasing 
areas” with high solar or wind resource value and low land 
use conflicts . All the royalties go to the U .S . Treasury . Prior 
to final issuance of the rule, the Solar Industries Associa-
tion had said it would add “time, uncertainty, complexity, 
and expense to a permitting process that is already substan-
tially more difficult to pursue than permitting on private 
lands .”48 Tension also emerged between those who want 
to make sure the federal government gets a good financial 
return on these leases, and those who argue that the rule, 
while formalizing what had been informal procedures, will 
increase the costs of building wind and solar facilities on 
federal land . As this is written, controversy remains over 
whether the rule on a net basis will help or hinder renew-
ables development .
As it is, rents for fossil fuel leases on BLM land (which 
are governed by the Mineral Leasing Act) are $2 per acre at 
most, in contrast to the rents set by BLM for solar, which 
are established according to a complex formula in the regu-
lations and are much higher .49 On top of the rental cost, 
royalties must be paid for fossil fuel production, but that 
is based on actual production; wind and solar operators 
must pay capacity fees regardless of actual production, 
though the capacity factor for each type of energy source is 
reflected in the rental rate .50
A bill to resolve some of these issues, the Public Lands 
Renewable Energy Development Act, has been intro-
duced in every Congress since 2011 . It has attracted broad 
45 . DOI, BLM, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Wind Energy Development on BLM-Administered Lands in the Western 
United States, (2005); see also Domenic A . Cossi, Getting Our Priorities 
Straight: Streamlining NEPA to Hasten Renewable Energy Development on 
Public Land, 31 Pub . Land & Resources L . Rev . 149 (2010) .
46 . Nick Lawton, Promoting Renewable Energy Development on Public Lands, 
Green Energy Inst ., Nov . 14, 2014, at 22 .
47 . 81 Fed . Reg . 92122 (Dec . 19, 2016) .
48 . Quoted in Memorandum from Andrew Vecera, Majority Committee 
Staff, to Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Members, on 
Legislative Hearing on H .R . 2663 (Rep . Paul Gosar, House Committee 
Report 3-4 (July 11, 2016)) .
49 . 43 C .F .R . §2806 .52 .
50 . Lawton, supra note 46, at 24; Susan Kraemer, BLM Charges Exorbitant Rent, 
Fees for Solar, Energy Storage Compared to Fossil Fuels, Renewable Energy 
World, Nov . 24, 2015; Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions 
for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development and 
Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed . Reg . 59023, 59033 (proposed 
Sept . 30, 2014); Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing 
Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development and Technical 
Changes and Corrections for 43 C .F .R . Parts 2800 and 2880, 81 Fed . Reg . 
92122 (Dec . 19, 2016) .
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bipartisan support . In the fall of 2016, it was part of a 
comprehensive energy bill being advanced by Sen . Lisa 
Murkowski (R-Alaska), but the bill was not enacted before 
the end of the 114th Congress . The bill would apply to all 
BLM and national Forest Service lands that have not been 
excluded from solar or wind energy development by prior 
plans, and would require evaluation of other U .S . Depart-
ment of Defense and Department of Agriculture lands for 
suitability for renewables . Programmatic EIS would be 
utilized to expedite project review . High-level interagency 
coordination would be required—something that all agree 
is important .
Rather than all the royalty revenue going to the Trea-
sury, the bill would allocate 25% to the states, 25% to the 
counties, 35% to a Renewable Energy Resource Conserva-
tion Fund, and 15% to the Treasury for use in assisting in 
the processing of renewable energy permit applications .51 
This 35% allocation to a conservation fund to help restore 
and protect fish and wildlife habitat and related projects 
has earned the bill the support of the Wilderness Society, 
Trout Unlimited, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
and other conservation and environmental groups . How-
ever, the wind and solar industries are still unhappy with 
the requirement for competitive bidding and the require-
ment for royalty payments .52
In another action taken in the final weeks of the Obama 
Administration, on December 22, 2016, BLM issued 
policy guidance on mitigation measures that could be 
employed in approving actions on public lands such as 
construction of renewable energy projects .53 The policy 
guidance followed previous mitigation reforms intended to 
provide more certainty to developers, while also producing 
better environmental results, when identifying compensa-
tory mitigation measures required as part of the permitting 
process .54 However, shortly after President Trump took 
office, the new Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, issued 
an order that “directs a reexamination of the mitigation 
policies and practices across the Department of the Interior 
 .  .  . in order to better balance conservation strategies and 
policies with the equally legitimate need of creating jobs for 
hard-working American families .”55
Tribal lands also have tremendous potential for renew-
able energy . A 2013 study by DOE found that American 
Indian land comprises approximately 2% of U .S . land, but 
contains an estimated 5% of all renewable energy resources, 
including about 14 billion megawatt-hours (MWh) of total 
technical potential on tribal lands for electricity generation 
51 . Kornze testimony, supra note 23, at 4 .
52 . Haubenstock testimony, supra note 39, at 10-11; Jennifer A . Dlouhy, 
Obama Rule Could Take Wind Out of Renewable Power on Public Land, 
Bloomberg Markets, Aug . 22, 2016 .
53 . BLM, Manual §1794, Mitigation (2016); BLM, Mitigation Handbook 
H-1794-1 (2016) .
54 . David J . Hayes, Addressing the Environmental Impacts of Large Infrastructure 
Projects: Making “Mitigation” Matter, 44 ELR 10016 (Jan . 2014), available 
at http://www .eli .org/sites/default/files/docs/elr-na/44 .elr_ .10016 .pdf .
55 . Secretary of the Interior Order No . 3349, American Energy Independence 
(Mar . 29, 2017), available at https://www .doi .gov/sites/doi .gov/files/
uploads/so_3349_-american_energy_independence .pdf .
from utility-scale rural solar resources, about 1,100 MWh 
from wind, and about 7 million MWh from hydropow-
er .56 In 2015, the GAO found that energy development on 
Indian lands has been hindered by poor management by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as by the complex 
regulatory framework, tribes’ limited capital and infra-
structure, and varied tribal capacity . This has led to missed 
development opportunities, lost revenue, and jeopardized 
viability of projects .57
Recommendations: The Western Solar Plan can serve as an 
exemplar for what can be accomplished without new leg-
islation . By undertaking an environmental review over a 
large geographic area that included a detailed examination 
of species presence and habitat, it satisfied the requirements 
of both NEPA and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) .58 
(The ESA is discussed in more detail below .) This way, the 
Western Solar Plan allowed individual projects within the 
study area to proceed quickly . BLM should identify more 
solar energy areas where this process could be utilized . The 
Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan is another 
example, though it took a long time to complete and des-
ignated only very limited areas for renewables . BLM has 
also launched more than a dozen “rapid ecoregional assess-
ments” that examine ecological conditions and trends in 
large ecoregions .59 As noted below, BLM’s Planning 2 .0 
rule, designed to facilitate large-scale land use planning, 
was annulled by Congress and President Trump in 2017 . 
This is a step backwards .
While BLM has made considerable progress in accom-
modating renewable projects on its land, the Forest Service 
has made much less progress and should take steps to catch 
up . The Forest Service has several policies in place pro-
moting wind and solar projects,60 and construction broke 
ground in September 2016 on the first utility-scale project 
actually to be built on its land, a 15-turbine wind project 
in the Green Mountain National Forest in Vermont .61 (The 
Forest Service does a great deal with biomass, but that is 
beyond the scope of this Article .)
The Public Lands Renewable Energy Development Act 
has been under consideration in Congress since 2011 . It 
would help encourage and expedite new renewable projects 
on public lands, and something like it should be enacted . 
In the deliberations over this bill, consideration should be 
given to relaxation of the fair market value requirement 
56 . DOE, Office of Indian Energy, Developing Clean Energy Projects 
on Tribal Lands: Data and Resources for Tribes 3 (2013), available at 
http://www .nrel .gov/docs/fy13osti/57748 .pdf .
57 . GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs, U .S . 
Senate, Indian Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA Has 
Hindered Energy Development on Indian Lands (2015) (GAO-15-
502) [hereinafter GAO, Indian Energy Development Report], available 
at http://www .gao .gov/assets/680/670701 .pdf .
58 . 16 U .S .C . §§1531-1544 .
59 . Id .; Hayes, supra note 54, at 10019 .
60 . See U .S . Forest Service, Special Uses-Energy, https://www .fs .fed .us/
specialuses/special_energy .shtml .
61 . “Avangrid, Governor Shumlin Break Ground on Deerfield Wind Farm,” 
Vermont Bus . Mag ., Sept . 19, 2016, http://www .vermontbiz .com/news/
september/avangrid-governor-shumlin-break-ground-deerfield-wind-farm .
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when leasing federal lands for renewables, since such relax-
ation would add to the economic incentive to build such 
facilities .62 This might result in a loss of federal revenues 
(if enough projects that would have proceeded anyway are 
able to enjoy the lower rents), but it would advance the 
decarbonization objective .
DOI should carefully review and consider acting on 
the GAO recommendations for improving the process 
for approving renewable energy projects on tribal lands, 
including changes to the processes for mapping lands, veri-
fying ownership, tracking reviews, providing guidance to 
tribes, and helping tribes eliminate capacity gaps .63
B. Offshore Wind
Difficult as it has been to site renewable projects on federal 
land, it has been even more difficult to do this offshore . 
However, the first offshore wind project has finally begun 
operation, and several more are in the pipeline .
The winds offshore tend to blow harder and more uni-
formly than the winds onshore . The potential energy pro-
duced from wind is directly proportional to the cube of 
the wind speed . As a result, in addition to being less inter-
mittent than onshore wind, the somewhat higher wind 
speeds typical offshore can generate much more energy . 
Most large population centers in the United States are near 
coastlines, so offshore wind would not require nearly as 
much new transmission capacity as onshore wind .64 The 
total technical potential for offshore wind in the United 
States—the amount of electricity that could be generated if 
turbines were placed everywhere physically possible—has 
been calculated as 4,200 gigawatts (GW),65 which is about 
four times the current capacity of the U .S . grid .66 The wind 
speeds are higher off the Pacific Coast than off the Atlantic 
and Gulf Coasts, but the water off the Atlantic and Gulf 
Coasts is much shallower, making the costs of offshore 
installations there lower .67
Denmark installed the world’s first offshore wind proj-
ect in 1991 . Since then, 142 more have become operational 
worldwide, with a total capacity of 13 .9 GW . Another 34 
are under construction with a capacity of 7 .7 GW, and 
142 have been approved, with a capacity of 44 .5 GW .68 
They are mostly in Europe, with some in China, Japan, 
and South Korea . The total number of operational offshore 
62 . There is considerable precedent for relaxing the fair market value requirement 
for certain favored uses on federal lands . See Pamela Baldwin, Fair 
Market Value for Wind and Solar Development on Public Land 11 
(Taxpayers for Common Sense & Wilderness Society Dec . 2010), available 
at http://www .taxpayer .net/images/uploads/downloads/FMV_Report .pdf .
63 . GAO, Indian Energy Development Report, supra note 57, at 36-38 .
64 . BOEM, Offshore Wind Energy, http://www .boem .gov/Offshore-Wind-
Energy/ (last visited May 1, 2017) .
65 . Anthony Lopez et al ., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U .S . 
Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis iv 
(2012) .
66 . EIA, Electricity Generating Capacity, https://www .eia .gov/electricity/
capacity/ (last visited May 11, 2017) .
67 . But see International Renewable Energy Agency, Floating 
Foundations: A Game Changer for Offshore Wind Power (2016) .
68 . The Wind Power, World Wind Farms Database, http://www .thewindpower .
net/store_continent_en .php?id_zone=1000 (last visited May 1, 2017) .
wind farms in the United States stood at zero until Decem-
ber 2016, when a very small facility (30 MW) started oper-
ations off Rhode Island . The best-known proposed project 
in the United States is Cape Wind in Massachusetts; this 
468-MW project was first proposed in 2001 and is still 
struggling with approvals and financing . Its delays have 
cast a pall over offshore wind in the United States . (The 
Rhode Island and Cape Wind projects will be discussed in 
more detail below .)
Many companies have attempted to build offshore wind 
farms in the United States but have been discouraged or 
blocked by regulatory fragmentation and confusion, shifts 
in political support, high costs, and public opposition . 
However, recent actions by the federal government and 
some states, plus technological advances and falling costs 
(though still much higher than onshore wind), coupled 
with the 2015 extension of the production tax credit, por-
tend a major expansion of offshore generation in the next 
few years, at least where the coastal states strongly and con-
sistently support it .
An extraordinary expansion will be needed . As shown 
in Table 5, the DDPP Mixed Scenario contemplates the 
construction of the equivalent of four Cape Wind-sized 
facilities every year by 2025, eight every year by 2030, 17 
every year by 2035, and 37 every year by 2045 . The total 
of 17 .5 GW that would need to be added in 2045 alone 
exceeds the 12 .5 GW capacity of all the offshore wind tur-
bines operating in the world today . Table 6 shows that the 
DDPP High Renewables Scenario involves 20 .5 GW being 
added in 2045 alone .
The state governments play an important role with off-
shore facilities . The states control the underwater land out 
to three nautical miles from shore69; beyond that, the fed-
eral government has control out to 200 nautical miles from 
shore .70 (However, for historical reasons, Florida and Texas 
control the seabed to about 10 nautical miles offshore in 
the Gulf of Mexico .71) Wind farms more than three miles 
offshore (as most of them would be)72 still need transmis-
sion lines running through state waters; and wind farms 
less than three miles offshore are still subject to various 
federal laws (discussed below) . Moreover, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA)73 provides for state review of 
certain activities occurring solely in federal waters . This 
means that every offshore wind farm needs both federal 
and state approvals—and, in almost every case, multiple 
approvals at each level of government .
Until 2005, the lead federal agency for offshore wind 
had been the U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), 
acting under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 . The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 shifted lead authority over all 
69 . Submerged Lands Act, 43 U .S .C . §1311(a)(1) .
70 . Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U .S .C . §1302 .
71 . Ben Deninger, The Twenty-First Century Offshore Wind Boom: Why Texas Is 
Leading the Way, 44 Tex . Envtl . L .J . 81, 91 (2014) .
72 . Timothy H . Powell, Revisiting Federalism Concerns in the Offshore Wind 
Energy Industry in Light of Continued Local Opposition to the Cape Wind 
Project, 92 B .U . L . Rev . 2023, 2029 (2012) .
73 . 16 U .S .C . §§1451-1466 .
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offshore energy projects (including wind, but not includ-
ing the Great Lakes) to the Secretary of the Interior, act-
ing through the Minerals Management Service, and 
authorized it to issue leases, easements, and rights-of-way 
for such projects . The Corps (as protector of navigation) 
retained permitting authority over offshore construction, 
and is still the lead federal agency for offshore wind energy 
in the Great Lakes . In October 2007, the Minerals Man-
agement Service issued a programmatic EIS for alternative 
energy development and production and alternative use of 
facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf .74 In 2009, the 
Minerals Management Service and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) resolved a long-standing 
jurisdictional dispute and entered into a memorandum of 
understanding that clarified that the Service has exclusive 
jurisdiction over offshore wind energy . The Service then 
issued detailed regulations for this program, providing for 
competitive and noncompetitive leasing of offshore lands .75 
In 2010, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the 
Minerals Management Service was broken into three parts; 
one of them, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM), inherited the offshore wind leasing process .
In 2011, BOEM and DOE issued a “National Offshore 
Wind Strategy,” which called for the deployment of 54 GW 
of offshore wind generating capacity by 2030 .76 (Under the 
DDPP Mixed Scenario, 20 GW of offshore wind would be 
added by 2030; under the DDPP High Renewables Sce-
nario, the figure would be 64 GW .)
In April 2015, DOE issued its Wind Vision report, which 
examined how wind could supply 10% of the nation’s elec-
trical demand in 2020, 20% in 2030, and 35% in 2050 . It 
studied a scenario with 22 GW of offshore wind capacity 
by 2030 and 86 GW by 2050 .77
In September 2016, BOEM and DOE released a new 
version of the National Offshore Wind Strategy . Among 
the challenges it said would need to be overcome in order 
to achieve the Wind Vision goals are reducing costs and 
technology risks, and ensuring efficiency, consistency, and 
clarity in the regulatory process .
Progress has been made on both of those fronts . As the 
Wind Vision report documents, costs have declined signifi-
cantly . In 2010, Secretary of the Interior Salazar launched 
a “Smart From the Start” program to speed wind deploy-
ment off the Atlantic Coast . BOEM hopes that Smart 
From the Start will reduce permitting time lines from the 
expected 7-10 years to half that or less .78 Key elements of 
that program include:
74 . BOEM, Guide to the OCS Alternative Energy Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), at http://www .boem .gov/Renewable-
Energy-Program/Regulatory-Information/Guide-To-EIS .aspx (last visited 
May 11, 2017) .
75 . 30 C .F .R . pt . 585 .
76 . DOE, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating an Offshore 
Wind Energy Industry in the United States iii (2011) (DOE/
EE-0798) .
77 . DOE, Wind Vision, supra Table 7, note e, at xxxiii, fig . ES .1-3 .
78 . DOE, supra note 76, at 17 .
•	 Streamlining the approval process for individual pro-
posed projects and eliminating unnecessary regula-
tory requirements .
•	 Implementing a comprehensive, expedited leasing 
framework for offshore wind development by identi-
fying so-called “wind energy areas” along the Atlan-
tic Outer Continental Shelf that appear most suitable 
for offshore wind energy development because of 
fewer user conflicts and resource issues . Wind energy 
areas have been identified through an interagency 
process that gathered information regarding the envi-
ronmental and geophysical attributes and other uses 
of these wind energy areas . That data were assembled 
in a publicly available format to help identify areas 
for development . Relevant federal departments with 
interests in the offshore areas were involved to reduce 
conflicts (e .g ., Department of Defense military train-
ing; Coast Guard navigation; National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration sensitive fishing 
grounds) . State and tribal officials in each of the rel-
evant states were consulted to obtain their input prior 
to the identification of wind energy areas .
•	 Moving aggressively on a separate but parallel track 
to process any applications to build offshore trans-
mission lines, such as a potential regional “backbone” 
line that would serve multiple future offshore wind 
projects along the Atlantic outer continental shelf .79
BOEM has designated 11 wind energy areas, where off-
shore areas will be leased for wind development .80 BOEM 
has awarded commercial leases for all of them . The leases 
could support a total of 14 .6 GW of capacity .81 BOEM is 
working to identify more areas . NEPA reviews are being 
tied to these designations, and arrangements are being 
made with other federal agencies and with the states in 
order to smooth the processes . The Smart From the Start 
program also involves a great deal of coordination on per-
mitting; the National Offshore Wind Strategy declares:
Several federal entities also have mandates to review 
and/or approve certain aspects of offshore wind projects, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and 
Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Department of 
Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Avia-
tion Administration, Department of Defense, U .S . Coast 
Guard, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . 
Numerous state, local, and tribal government entities, as 
well as other stakeholders, must also be consulted in the 
permitting process . The mandates of these various enti-
79 . DOE, supra note 76, at 13 .
80 . BOEM, Mid-Atlantic Wind Energy Areas, http://www .boem .gov/Mid-
Atlantic-Wind-Energy-Areas/ (last visited May 11, 2017); BOEM, North 
Atlantic Wind Energy Areas, http://www .boem .gov/North-Atlantic-Wind-
Energy-Areas/ (last visited May 11, 2017) .
81 . DOE & DOI, National Offshore Wind Strategy: Facilitating the 
Development of the Offshore Wind Industry in the United States 
(2016) (DOE/GO-102016-4866) .
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ties include managing protected species, managing com-
mercial and recreational fisheries, protecting marine and 
coastal habitats, and designation and protection of marine 
areas with special significance due to their conservation, 
recreational, ecological, historical, scientific, cultural, 
archeological, educational, or aesthetic qualities .82
The state role is strengthened by the CZMA . Under the 
Act, states prepare coastal zone management plans . Once 
a state plan has been approved by the Secretary of Com-
merce, all federal actions must be consistent with that plan, 
subject to very limited exceptions .83
The difficulties in working with all these federal and state 
agencies are highlighted by the tortuous path followed by 
the Cape Wind project . After being proposed in 2001, the 
project went through the NEPA process and obtained the 
permits it needed from the Corps, but it had to mostly start 
over when Congress shifted authority for offshore wind 
to DOI in 2005 . DOI prepared a new EIS and approved 
the project in 2010 . Other needed permits were issued in 
2011 . But the project was opposed by several prominent 
and wealthy owners of property in Cape Cod, including 
several members of the Kennedy family and one of the 
Koch brothers, and numerous lawsuits were filed .84 Each 
new approval provided the opportunity for a new lawsuit . 
Among these were a suit by the Aquinnah Wampanoag 
Tribe of Gay Head in Martha’s Vineyard, which claimed 
that the project would disrupt views that are necessary for 
their religious observances, and would violate their ances-
tral burial grounds85; and another seeking to overturn the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s determination that the 
project would not be a hazard to flight .
The developers estimated they spent more than $70 
million fighting the regulatory and legal battles . They 
seemed to have won them all, but in January 2015, the two 
utility companies that had signed power purchase agree-
ments to buy most of the power output, discouraged by the 
lengthy delays, terminated the agreements .86 In July 2016, 
the U .S . Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit rejected most of the challengers’ latest claims, but 
found that BOEM had violated NEPA by using inadequate 
data about the seafloor and subsurface hazards, and must 
supplement the EIS . The court also found that FWS had 
erred in disregarding certain submissions before issuing an 
approval under the ESA .87 Sixteen years after the project 
was first proposed, its fate remains very much in doubt .
82 . DOE, supra note 76, at 11 (abbreviations omitted) .
83 . 16 U .S .C . §1456 . See also Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and 
Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the 
Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 Envtl . L . 1101 (2012) .
84 . Katharine Q . Seelye, Koch Brother Wages 12-Year Fight Over Wind Farm, 
N .Y . Times, Oct . 22, 2013; Robert F . Kennedy Jr ., An Ill Wind Off Cape 
Cod, N .Y . Times, Dec . 16, 2005 .
85 . Public Employees for Envtl . Responsibility v . Beaudreau, 25 F . Supp . 3d 67, 
44 ELR 20058 (D .D .C . 2014) .
86 . Lawrence Susskind & Ryan Cook, The Cost of Contentiousness: A Status 
Report on Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States, 33 Va . Envtl . L .J . 204, 
219-21 (2015); Powell, supra note 72, at 2025-27 .
87 . Public Employees for Envtl . Responsibility v . Hopper, No . 14-5301 (D .C . 
Cir . July 5, 2016) .
This Massachusetts saga is in stark contrast to what 
has happened next door in Rhode Island .88 By the mid-
2000s, Rhode Island realized that it needed to expand its 
production of renewable energy, and that offshore might 
be a good place to do that . It conducted extensive stud-
ies of the offshore area, including marine ecology, cli-
mate, cultural and historical resources, fisheries, tourism, 
and recreation . The state’s coastal regulator, the Coastal 
Resources Management Council, hired the University of 
Rhode Island to conduct the studies . They were utilized 
in undertaking a program of marine spatial planning—
essentially, zoning the ocean to determine what sorts of 
activities should take place where and when . Interests 
that might otherwise be skeptical, including the fishing 
industry, were brought in early .
This led to the creation of the Rhode Island Ocean 
Special Area Management Plan (RI O-SAMP) . Such 
plans are authorized by the CZMA, but had not previ-
ously been employed to plan for wind energy . They also 
tended to stop at the three-mile line; but the Coastal 
Resources Management Council, acting in the absence of 
a well-defined regulatory regime, went where the science 
took it, and its plan crossed into federal waters . The plan 
identified a site three miles southeast of Block Island as 
best suited for wind turbines . It did not hurt that Block 
Island is not connected to the mainland electric grid, and 
relies on diesel fuel to generate electricity; thus, the wind 
farm could lower Block Island’s high electric bills, and 
the local government came to support the project (unlike 
what had happened in Cape Cod) .
The U .S . Department of Commerce, eager to advance 
offshore wind, was receptive to this approach and accepted 
the RI O-SAMP into the state’s coastal zone manage-
ment plan . BOEM agreed to include the identified federal 
waters in the relevant wind energy area and lease them for 
offshore wind .
While all this was being done, the state issued a request 
for proposals to identify a qualified company to build a 
five-turbine 30-MW demonstration wind farm . The state 
selected Deepwater Wind, which was able to rely on the 
studies conducted by the state, and it agreed to reimburse 
the state for the $3 .2 million cost of the studies . Since the 
studies had already been done, Deepwater Wind was able 
to obtain the needed federal and state permits within two 
years of applying .
Another element of this success was a power purchase 
agreement that would assure Deepwater Wind of a mar-
ket for its electricity at a price that allowed it to obtain 
financing . With the strong support of the state’s gover-
nor and legislature, National Grid entered into a power 
purchase agreement that some large ratepayers argued 
was above market prices . The state public utilities com-
mission rejected the agreement based on its high cost, but 
88 . This account of the events in Rhode Island is drawn from Michael Burger, 
Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond 
the States’ Territorial Seas, 41 ELR 10602 (July 2011); John M . Boehnert, A 
New Blueprint for Coastal Zone Management, 30 Nat . Resources & Env’t 
52 (2016); Susskind & Cook, supra note 86 .
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promptly afterwards, the legislature passed and the gov-
ernor signed a law requiring the utility commission to 
consider environmental and other issues . In view of the 
project’s environmental benefits, the commission then 
approved the agreement, and this approval was upheld by 
both the Rhode Island Supreme Court89 and the U .S . Dis-
trict Court .90 The facility began operation in December 
2016 . It is the first offshore wind farm in the United States, 
and, though it is small, it is being heralded as a model for 
federal-state cooperation in building projects of this sort .
New York may not be far behind Rhode Island . Gov . 
Andrew Cuomo has announced his strong support for a 
wind farm off Long Island, and in September 2016, the 
state released a “blueprint” for the New York State Offshore 
Wind Master Plan, declaring that New York has 39 GW of 
wind potential off its Atlantic Coast .91 BOEM has identi-
fied a wind energy area off Long Island, and in Decem-
ber 2016, Statoil ASA, a subsidiary of a Norwegian energy 
company, won a BOEM auction to build a wind farm there 
of about 800 MW .92 A coalition of fishing advocates, local 
towns, and municipalities sued BOEM, claiming that an 
EIS should have been prepared first . The U .S . District 
Court for the District of Columbia denied their motion for 
a preliminary injunction blocking the lease sale .93
Several of the states along the eastern seaboard have 
adopted statutory or regulatory programs to facilitate off-
shore wind, hoping the economic and political environ-
ments will become hospitable for such projects .94 In August 
2016, Massachusetts enacted a law requiring electric utili-
ties to acquire a combined total of 1,600 MW of electricity 
from offshore wind; long-term contracts must be signed by 
2027 . However, this law was written to make Cape Wind 
ineligible to participate in this program .95
On the other hand, in May 2016, New Jersey Gov . 
Chris Christie vetoed a bill that would have advanced a 
proposed wind farm off Atlantic City,96 amid charges from 
the Sierra Club that he is “holding offshore wind hostage 
to his national political ambitions .”97 A fellow Republi-
can governor, Paul LePage of Maine, has been so cool to 
89 . In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A .3d 482 
(R .I . 2011) .
90 . Riggs v . Curran, No 15-342 (D .R .I . July 7, 2016) .
91 . New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 
Blueprint for the New York State Offshore Wind Master Plan 
(2016) .
92 . Saqib Rahim & Daniel Cusick, New York: How Statoil Edged Out the State 
on a Massive Bid, Energywire, Dec . 19, 2016 . See also Philip E . Karmel et 
al ., The Proposed Wind Farm Off the Shore of Long Island, Envtl . L . N .Y ., 
Sept . 2016 .
93 . Memorandum Opinion, Fisheries Survival Fund v . Jewell, No . 1:16-cv-
02409, 47 ELR 20026 (D .D .C . issued Feb . 15, 2017), http://www .eenews .
net/assets/2017/02/16/document_gw_01 .pdf .
94 . Katherine A . Roek, Offshore Wind Energy in the United States: A Legal and 
Policy Patchwork, 25 Nat . Resources & Env’t 24 (2011) .
95 . Zahra Hirji, Massachusetts’ Ambitious Clean Energy Bill Jolts Offshore Wind 
Prospects, Inside Climate News, Aug . 2, 2016; Bob Salsberg, 6 Things to 
Know About Massachusetts’ New Energy Law, Boston .com, Aug . 13, 2016 .
96 . Joyce Hannon, Gov. Christie Vetoes Latest Offshore Wind Farms Bill, Law360, 
May 2, 2016 .
97 . Jeff Tittel, Christie Made NJ a Loser on Offshore Wind, Daily J ., Aug . 25, 
2016; R . William Potter, Opinion: Candidate Christie’s Fateful About-Face on 
Wind Power, NJ Spotlight, June 29, 2016 .
offshore wind that a Norwegian company that had been 
poised to build there withdrew .98 For the Great Lakes, 
where BOEM has no jurisdiction, one commentator has 
written that without modifications to the coastal zone 
management process (which does apply):
[S]tates may be reluctant to proceed, leaving them unpre-
pared to face the headwinds that lie ahead . The snarled 
web of regulatory authorities, acts, and regulations must 
be sorted out now so that when the technological and 
infrastructural challenges are worked out, offshore deploy-
ment can take off in smooth, charted waters .99
Texas has a strong renewable portfolio standard, a tra-
dition of permitting energy projects with relatively light 
environmental regulation, and control of the waters of 
the Gulf of Mexico beyond 10 nautical miles . It seemed 
poised to build offshore wind, but what may have been 
the most promising developer withdrew in 2013; Texas 
has by far the greatest amount of onshore wind power 
in the United States, and its cost is much lower than off-
shore facilities .100
Recommendations: BOEM should continue its designation 
of wind energy areas, and prepare programmatic EIS to 
expedite approval of projects in those areas . The most recent 
BOEM auction for offshore wind areas, held in December 
2016 for a site off Long Island, New York, attracted six seri-
ous bidders and was won by a Norwegian-based company, 
Statoil .101 This is one indication of considerable commercial 
interest in building such facilities .
In the first months of the Trump Administration, 
BOEM conducted an auction for offshore wind for 
water off Kitty Hawk, North Carolina; a Spanish-based 
company won . BOEM also announced it plans to stage 
another competitive lease auction in New England waters, 
triggered by unsolicited applications for the same area by 
Statoil and a German company .102 These sorts of actions 
should continue .
Major federal facilities on the coastlines, such as large 
naval bases, should consider committing to purchas-
ing power from offshore wind facilities . Power purchase 
agreements would considerably help project developers 
secure financing .
98 . Maine Governor: Wind Power Is Too Expensive, Seacoastonline .com, Apr . 
4 2015; Susskind & Cook, supra note 86, at 226 .
99 . Sarah Schenck, Maneuvering the Headwinds Facing Offshore Wind 
Development in the Great Lakes: Amending the Coastal Zone Management Act, 
98 Minn . L . Rev . 2479, 2510 (2013/2014) . See also Ashlyn N . Mausolf, 
Clearing the Regulatory Hurdles and Promoting Offshore Wind Development 
in Michigan, 89 U . Det . Mercy L . Rev . 223 (2012) .
100 . Kent Harrington, Texas Is Giving Away Wind Energy, ChEnected, Nov . 
30, 2015; Mark Del Franco, Offshore Wind Developer Baryonyx Pulls Plug on 
GoWind Demonstration Project, N . Am . Windpower, June 5, 2014; Anthony 
V . Bova, What’s the Holdup? How Bureaucratic Obstacles Are Undercutting the 
True Potential of American Wind Power, 46 Suffolk U . L . Rev . 571, 593 
(2013); Deninger supra note 71, at 91-94 .
101 . Diane Cardwell, Off Long Island, Wind Power Tests the Waters, N .Y . Times, 
Jan . 21, 2017 .
102 . Derrick Z . Jackson, Made in America: Trump Embracing Offshore Wind?, Daily 
Climate, Apr . 3, 2017, http://www .dailyclimate .org/tdc-newsroom/2017/
april/made-in-america-trump-embracing-offshore-wind/ .
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Congress should instruct reviewing agencies that 
unavoidable visual and aesthetic impacts do not provide a 
basis for denying wind energy permits . There appears to be 
little evidence that offshore wind projects seriously impair 
property values, and even if they did, the decarbonization 
objective should take precedence .
Congress could include preference for offshore renew-
able energy projects in the CZMA consistency process .103 
This would make it more difficult for reluctant states to 
disapprove these projects should that issue arise .
States with offshore wind capacity should develop and 
implement processes to promptly review and act upon 
applications for offshore wind projects .
C. Disturbed Land
Contaminated sites, old mining areas, and closed landfills 
provide potential places to build solar or wind facilities . 
The land is typically inexpensive, and its owners are often 
happy to realize a little income—or even have someone else 
take it off their hands—if this use allows them to avoid the 
great expense of cleaning it up so that it can be suitable for 
residential use .
The U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has established the RE-Powering America’s Land Initia-
tive to encourage and facilitate such actions . It reports 
that nearly 180 installations of renewable energy have 
been built on these sites, with a cumulative installed 
capacity of just over 1,124 MW .104 As part of this pro-
gram, EPA has developed an online mapping tool that 
has preliminarily screened more than 80,000 sites on 
more than 43 million acres for solar, wind, biomass, and 
geothermal potential .105
On December 5, 2013, President Obama issued a Presi-
dential Memorandum, Presidential Leadership on Energy 
Management, that not only directed all federal agencies 
to obtain 10% of their yearly electricity from renewable 
resources by 2015 and 20% by 2020, but also directed that 
“[a]gencies shall consider opportunities to the extent eco-
nomically feasible and technically practical, to install or 
contract for energy installed on current or formerly con-
taminated lands, landfills, and mine sites .”106
One of the principal impediments stems from the fact 
that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) makes anyone 
who assumes ownership or operation of a contaminated 
site potentially liable for its cleanup .107 EPA insists that it 
will ordinarily not take enforcement action against renew-
103 . Thaler, supra note 83, at 1148 .
104 . U .S . EPA, RE-Powering Accomplishment Highlights, https://www .epa .gov/
re-powering/re-powering-accomplishment-highlights (last updated Nov . 1, 
2016) .
105 . U .S . EPA, Developing Mapping and Screening Tools—RE-Powering Mapper,
https://www .epa .gov/re-powering/re-powering-accomplishment-highlights# 
highlight_1 (last updated Nov . 1, 2016) .
106 . Charles B . Howland, Brightfields: Sustainable Opportunities for Renewable 
Energy Projects on Environmentally Impaired Lands, 29 Nat . Resources & 
Env’t 41 (2014) .
107 . 42 U .S .C . §§9601-9675, §9607 (CERCLA §107) . 
ables developers who build on contaminated land, and in 
July 2014, it issued its Liability Reference Guide for Siting 
Renewable Energy on Contaminated Properties . Several 
states have enacted laws encouraging the reuse of disturbed 
land for renewable projects .108 However, many developers 
and their lenders remain skittish, in the absence of a more 
legally binding assurance of no liability, even though the 
actual risks are very modest .109
Several other developments are easing the way to finding 
sites for renewable energy facilities . The Federal Highway 
Administration is encouraging the use of highway rights-
of-way for siting such facilities .110 California has adopted a 
statute making it easier to use otherwise-restricted agricul-
tural lands that have “severely adverse soil conditions” or 
“significantly reduced agricultural productivity” for renew-
able energy facilities .111 Some farmers have found that it is 
more lucrative to lease certain land for renewable facilities 
than to grow crops there .112
In one particularly ambitious effort, in 2016, the Con-
servation Biology Institute and the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, School of Law published a study of land 
(most of it privately owned) in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley where a collaborative process involving multiple 
stakeholders determined that solar PV could be sited with 
minimum conflicts with agriculture, species habitat, and 
other conservation concerns . Out of 9 .5 million acres in 
the study area, 470,000 acres of land were identified, theo-
retically capable of providing 94,000 MW—greater than 
all combined in-state generation capacity .113
Recommendations: Congress could provide a liability 
exemption under CERCLA for the developers of renewable 
energy facilities on contaminated land, assuming they have 
followed specified standards and procedures .
States could adopt similar liability exemptions for 
renewable energy facilities under their own laws on con-
taminated land liability .
Other states could adopt laws similar to California’s law 
encouraging renewables development on disturbed agricul-
tural land .
States should conduct surveys to determine what dis-
turbed lands (and other privately owned lands) would be 
suitable for renewable energy facilities .
108 . Amy Morris et al ., Green Siting for Green Energy, 5 J . Energy & Envtl . L . 
17 (2014) .
109 . Peter Trimarchi, Structured Approach Can Help Solar Developers Fulfill 
Promise of Brownfields, Daily Env’t Rep . (BNA), Oct . 17, 2013, at B-1 .
110 . Federal Highway Administration, Renewable Energy Generation 
in the Highway Right-of-Way (2016) (FHWA-HEP-16-052), available 
at http://www .fhwa .dot .gov/environment/climate_change/mitigation/
publications/row/renewablerow .pdf .
111 . 2011 Cal . Stat . ch . 596; see also Amy Odens, A New Crop for Agricultural 
Land: The Renewable Energy Mandate and Its Potential to Turn Farm Lands 
Into Energy Fields, 44 McGeorge L . Rev . 1037 (2013) .
112 . Joe Ryan, Harvesting Sunshine More Lucrative Than Crops at Some U.S. 
Farms, Env’t Rep . (BNA), Mar . 31, 2016, at A-9 .
113 . Dustin Pearce et al ., University of California, Berkeley, Law School 
& Conservation Biology Institute, A Path Forward: Identifying the 
Least-Conflict Solar PV Development in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley (2016), available at https://www .law .berkeley .edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/A-PATH-FORWARD-May-2016 .pdf .
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IV. NEPA
As noted above, large projects needing federal approv-
als, or federal onshore or offshore land, typically require 
an EIS under NEPA . Some states have their own impact 
assessment laws (“little NEPAs”) that require EIS for 
state- or locally approved projects that are not undergo-
ing EIS under NEPA . Many of the studies, hearings, and 
other processes involved in project approval are subsumed 
within the federal or state EIS processes, so while the EIS 
is being prepared, many other necessary tasks are being 
accomplished; delays should not be attributed entirely (or 
even mostly) to the EIS process .114 But the NEPA and little 
NEPA processes can be extremely time-consuming and, as 
discussed below, several actions have been taken to speed 
up the processes, and more can be done .
An annual survey found that for federal EIS made 
available in 2014, there was an average of 1,709 days 
(4 .7 years) between the issuance of the notice of intent 
to prepare an EIS and the issuance of the final EIS . Of 
the agencies most heavily involved in renewable energy 
projects, the average time for FERC was 1,201 days 
(with a range from 938 days to 2,985 days); for BLM, 
the average was 1,423 days (with a range from 839 days 
to 2,590 days) .115
This does not span the full time between proposal 
and final construction approval; it takes at least months 
and sometimes years before a project reaches the point 
that an agency will issue a notice to prepare an EIS, and 
once the final EIS is complete, more months or years can 
pass until all permits are issued and construction may 
begin . Actual building also takes time, of course; one 
study found that for wind and solar projects, two to four 
years typically lapse between the start of construction 
and commercial operation .116
Project developers have long bemoaned delays caused by 
NEPA and the little NEPAs, and there have been many 
calls to reform and shorten the processes . The Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) has performed numerous 
studies with this aim .117 Improvements were made around 
the edges, but the most important change did not occur 
until December 2015 .
As a lead-up to this, in 2010, DOI issued an order estab-
lishing a new interagency approach to facilitate permit-
ting decisions for the siting and development of renewable 
114 . Linda Luther, Congressional Research Service, The Role of the 
Environmental Review Process in Federally Funded Highway 
Projects: Background and Issues for Congress 2-5 (2012); GAO, 
National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information Exists on 
NEPA Analyses 18-19 (2014) (GAO-14-369) .
115 . Piet deWitt & Carole deWitt, Preparation Times for Environmental Impact 
Statements Made Available in 2014, in Annual NEPA Report 2014, at 8 
(Karen Johnson ed ., National Association of Environmental Professionals 
2015) .
116 . Steve Pociask & Joseph P . Fuhr Jr ., U .S . Chamber of Commerce, 
Project No Project: Progress Denied: A Study on the Potential 
Economic Impact of Permitting Challenges Facing Proposed 
Energy Projects 9 (2011) .
117 . E.g., CEQ, Modernizing NEPA Implementation (2003) .
energy projects on public lands .118 This order proposed early 
collaboration inside and outside government, set schedules 
and monitored compliance with them, and added resources 
to the review process . All this helped reduce the time for 
processing solar and wind energy permits from an average 
of four years to one-and-a-half years .119
On August 31, 2011, President Obama issued a Presi-
dential Memorandum calling on federal agencies to expe-
dite the review of high-priority infrastructure projects . 
This led to the creation of the Federal Infrastructure Proj-
ects Permitting Dashboard, which tracked the permitting 
of approximately 50 selected major highway and transit 
projects . The dashboard was designed to provide greater 
transparency into agency decisionmaking by publicly 
announcing and tracking important NEPA milestones .
On March 22, 2012, the president took further action 
by signing Executive Order No . 13604, Improving Perfor-
mance of Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure 
Projects . It established a steering committee comprising 
deputy secretaries or their equivalents from the 12 fed-
eral agencies most likely to be involved in infrastructure 
projects, charged with identifying best practices for infra-
structure permitting and review . The steering committee 
issued its report in June 2012 and eventually developed the 
Implementation Plan for Modernizing Infrastructure Per-
mitting . The White House developed the Federal Plan for 
Modernizing the Federal Permitting and Review Process 
for Better Projects, Improved Environmental and Com-
munity Outcomes, and Quicker Decisions, followed by an 
implementation plan that the steering committee issued in 
May 2014 .
In 2015, Sens . Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Claire 
McCaskill (D-Mo .) introduced the Federal Permitting 
Act, which adopted many of the recommendations that 
grew out of the process just described . That bill was folded 
almost entirely into the transportation appropriations 
bill as Title XLI, Federal Permitting Improvement . On 
December 4, 2015, President Obama signed this bill into 
law; it became the FAST Act .120
FAST borrows many of the key features of the presi-
dent’s initiative to expedite federal decisionmaking 
through improved efficiency, increased transparency, and 
application of best practices .121 For example, it establishes 
the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council, the 
composition of which closely tracks the steering committee 
created by Executive Order No . 13604 . The council is run 
by an executive director who is appointed by the president 
(without needing U .S . Senate confirmation) . Moreover, the 
statute requires that federal agencies maintain an online 
118 . DOI, Secretarial Order No . 3285A1, Renewable Energy Development by 
the Department of the Interior (Feb . 22, 2010) .
119 . David J . Hayes, Congress Just Enacted New Permitting Requirements for Energy 
Projects: Did You Miss It?, Stan . L . Sch . Blog, Dec . 10, 2015, https://law .
stanford .edu/2015/12/10/congress-just-enacted-new-permitting-requirements- 
for-energy-projects-did-you-miss-it/ .
120 . Pub . L . No . 114-94, 129 Stat . 1312 .
121 . This summary is drawn from Edward McTiernan et al ., Expediting 
Environmental Review and Permitting of Infrastructure Projects: The 2015 
FAST Act and NEPA, Real Est . Fin . J . 50 (Winter/Spring 2016) .
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permitting dashboard that presents project-specific permit-
ting timetables, including projected dates for completion 
of environmental reviews and issuance of permits .
The permitting provisions apply to a broad swath of 
projects, not only those involving surface transportation . 
FAST applies to activities “involving construction of infra-
structure for renewable or conventional energy produc-
tion, electricity transmission,” and many other kinds of 
infrastructure .122 To qualify as a covered project, the ini-
tial anticipated total investment must be likely to exceed 
$200,000,000, and the project must trigger NEPA and be 
of a “size and complexity” such that “in the opinion of the 
Council  .  .  . the project [is] likely to benefit from enhanced 
oversight and coordination  .  .  .  .”123
The council plays a key role in refining FAST’s scheme 
for modernizing infrastructure permitting . The council is 
required to survey the key federal development agencies, 
develop an inventory of covered projects, and identify 
appropriate project categories . Based upon these catego-
ries, by December 2016, the council “shall develop recom-
mended performance schedules, including intermediate 
and final completion dates, for environmental reviews 
and authorizations most commonly required for each 
category .   .   .   .”124 These schedules “shall reflect employ-
ment of the use of the most efficient applicable processes, 
including the alignment of Federal reviews of projects 
and reduction of permitting and project delivery time .”125 
These schedules are not to exceed the average completion 
time for comparable projects . The statute creates a pro-
cess for computing and then continuously updating these 
average completion times .
The new law further requires that
[e]ach performance schedule shall specify that any deci-
sion by an agency on an environmental review or authori-
zation must be issued not later than 180 days after the date 
on which all information needed to complete the review or 
authorization (including any hearing that an agency holds 
on the matter) is in the possession of the applicant .126
Furthermore, “[e]ach Federal agency shall conform to 
the completion dates set forth in the permitting timeta-
ble established  .  .  .” by the council .127 FAST stops short of 
allowing default approvals when agencies miss final dead-
lines . Nevertheless, it may give project sponsors a basis for 
seeking judicial relief for delayed permit decisions . Each 
covered project will have a lead agency, which will estab-
lish a plan for coordinating public and agency participa-
tion in any required federal environmental review, and set 
a permitting timetable, which may only be modified under 
limited circumstances . There are also constraints on how 
long the review date may be extended .
122 . Pub . L . No . 114-94, §41001(6)(A) .
123 . Id .
124 . Id . §41002(c)(1)(C)(i) .
125 . Id . §41002(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I) .
126 . Id . §41002(c)(1)(C)(ii)(II)(cc) .
127 . Id . §41003(c)(2)(F)(i) .
Other federal agencies are directed to cooperate with the 
lead agency in the processing of the application . Any dis-
putes among agencies are to be resolved through a process 
established by the statute . The statute limits judicial review 
of project approvals by setting a two-year statute of limita-
tions; allowing only parties that submitted comments dur-
ing the environmental review process to sue, and then only 
about issues that had been raised in the comments; and in 
ruling on preliminary injunction motions, the court must 
consider the potential effects on public health, safety, the 
environment, and jobs . The statute also provides for coor-
dination with state approvals, and for use of environmen-
tal review information developed at the state level so as to 
avoid unnecessary duplication .
On September 22, 2016, in one of its final public acts 
before President Obama left office, the council published 
an initial list of 34 covered projects .128 As of April 10, 2017, 
31 projects were posted on the council’s permitting dash-
board; seven of these were renewable energy projects (solar 
and hydropower) .129
On January 24, 2017, just-inaugurated President 
Trump issued an Executive Order, Expediting Envi-
ronmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority 
Infrastructure .130 It directs the CEQ to take the lead in 
coordinating federal efforts to expedite projects that are 
selected “after consideration of the project’s importance 
to the general welfare, value to the Nation, environ-
mental benefits, and such other factors as the Chairman 
[of CEQ] deems relevant .” This language is certainly 
broad enough to encompass renewable energy projects . 
It is unclear why this Executive Order did not reference 
the FAST Act . However, the Executive Order signifies 
President Trump’s commitment to expediting project 
approval . It is unclear whether renewable projects will 
benefit from this commitment, or whether the FAST Act 
will be utilized effectively . However, the FAST Act cre-
ates a statutory basis for expediting approvals .
Recommendations: Federal agencies should structure their 
reviews of new wind and solar capacity so that they can be 
completed as quickly as is reasonably possible . As noted at 
the beginning of this Article, in order to meet the DDPP 
targets, the amount of new wind and solar capacity that 
will need to be added each year must be an order of mag-
nitude higher than what has been achieved in prior years . 
Even with an expedited NEPA process of the sort intended 
by FAST, reviewing and approving all these new facilities 
could swamp the ability of the regulatory agencies to han-
dle such a volume . Two approaches are readily apparent .
The first is to increase staffing at the agencies . Given the 
difficulty in increasing government budgets, it has become 
increasingly common for agencies to allow or require appli-
128 . Permitting Dashboard, FPISC Announces FAST-41 Covered Projects, https://
www .permits .performance .gov/about/news/executive-director-announces-
fast-41-covered-projects (last updated Mar . 11, 2017) .
129 . Permitting Dashboard, Projects, https://www .permits .performance .gov/
projects (last visited May 1, 2017) .
130 . Exec . Order No . 13766, 82 Fed . Reg . 8657 (Jan . 30, 2017) .
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
7-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 10605
cants to help pay for the costs of review, often through the 
use of higher permit application fees, enabling more staff or 
contractors to be hired to perform these tasks . (For exam-
ple, DOI already arranges for applicants to pay for certain 
review work .) This of course leads to concerns over whether 
the reviews are completely independent . These problems are 
reduced if the funds go into general agency coffers rather 
than being used to hire personnel to look at specific proj-
ects .131 These additional personnel resources could assist 
with the full range of permitting issues—not only those 
under NEPA . It will be important to ensure that the agencies 
retain control of the review work to minimize the chances of 
applicant capture . It is also important not to further reduce 
the staffing levels of the federal review agencies .
The second approach is to require fewer project-specific 
EIS by, for example, the more strategic use of program-
matic EIS . As discussed above, BLM’s Western Solar Plan, 
and BOEM’s designation of wind energy areas, both suc-
cessfully utilized programmatic EIS to consider impacts of 
similar projects over a broad geographic area .
Another way to reduce the number of EIS is to allow 
more projects to obtain approvals with a lower degree of 
environmental review . There are three levels of NEPA 
review: categorical exclusions (meaning that projects are of 
a type or size that have been previously determined not 
to have a significant environmental impact, and therefore 
not needing further environmental review); environmental 
assessments, which are shorter than EIS, leading to a find-
ing of no significant impact (FONSI); and full EIS . Of 
all actions subject to NEPA, about 95% receive categorical 
exclusions; about 5% receive FONSIs; and fewer than 1% 
have EIS .132
A middle ground between a standard FONSI and a 
full EIS is a “mitigated FONSI”—a finding that no EIS 
is required if certain specified actions are taken to miti-
gate the project’s impacts . Courts have accepted mitigated 
FONSIs as compliant with NEPA .133 CEQ or project-
approving agencies such as BLM or BOEM could amend 
their NEPA regulations to provide that a mitigated FONSI 
is the preferred method for reviewing certain kinds of 
renewable projects if specified types of mitigation measures 
are undertaken and if the particular site does not pose spe-
cial problems .134
131 . See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 
46 Akron L . Rev . 1091 (2013); Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design 
and Innovation in Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 Ecology 
L .Q . 1091 (2006); Pat Ware, Hazardous Waste: Several States With Privatized 
Programs Getting Speedier Cleanups at Lower Cost, Daily Env’t Rep . (BNA), 
Aug . 9, 2012, at B-1; Karen Young, Air Pollution: New Georgia Program Will 
Allow Companies to Pay Fees to Accelerate Air Permit Process, Daily Env’t 
Rep . (BNA), June 27, 2013, at A-4 .
132 . GAO, supra note 114, at 7 . For an innovative legislative approach to 
providing NEPA categorical exclusions to actions that meet certain 
conditions, see Jamilee E . Holmstead, Looking a Gift Horse in the 
Mouth: 2014 Farm Bill Insect and Disease Restoration Provisions—True 
Gift or False Hope? (2015) (M .S . thesis, Utah State University), http://
digitalcommons .usu .edu/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article=5523&context=etd .
133 . City of Auburn v . United States, 154 F .3d 1025, 1033, 29 ELR 20096 (9th 
Cir . 1998) .
134 . See Trevor Salter, NEPA and Renewable Energy: Realizing the Most 
Environmental Benefit in the Quickest Time, 34 Environs Envtl . L . & Pol’y 
Along similar lines, several cities (most prominently 
Chicago and San Francisco) offer projects that meet cer-
tain environmental standards expedited review, reduced 
permit fees, and other benefits .135 Likewise, agencies could 
grant review preference to renewable projects that met 
specified conditions .
The federal government should vigorously imple-
ment the new FAST provisions to achieve the expedited 
review of renewable energy projects . One element would 
be the imposition of time limits on reviews under NEPA, 
the ESA, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act for 
renewable projects .136
Federal agencies with permitting or review roles should 
be required—perhaps through an amendment to CEQ’s 
NEPA regulations—to address their issues on the front-
end of the process, before projects are set in stone and 
before the scoping of an EIS . Too often, this now happens 
much later in the process .137
The CEQ NEPA regulations should require agencies to 
consider the positive as well as the negative environmental 
impacts of proposed actions when making decisions after 
environmental review; this is not always done now . The 
positive impacts of renewable energy projects can include 
reduced fossil fuel use .
V. State and Local Approvals
Many central station renewable projects require federal 
approvals, but all require state approvals and some also 
need local approvals . Some states and localities have been 
very hospitable to such projects; others have been less so . 
This section discusses the obstacles that some states and 
localities have posed to utility-scale projects, and how those 
obstacles might be addressed .
With respect to wind, as noted above, the leader by 
far is Texas . As of December 2016, it had 20,321 MW 
of installed wind capacity, nearly triple the second state, 
Iowa, with 6,917 MW, and the third, Oklahoma, which 
had 6,645 MW . The rest of the top 10 were California, 
with 5,662 MW; Kansas, 4,451 MW; Illinois, 4,026 MW; 
Minnesota, 3,526 MW; Oregon, 3,163 MW; Washington, 
3,075 MW; and Colorado, 3,026 MW .138
As for solar, California is on top by a wide margin . As 
of December 2016, it had 18,296 MW of installed utility-
scale solar capacity . Next were North Carolina, with 3,016 
MW; Arizona, 2,982 MW; Nevada, 2,191 MW; New Jer-
sey, 1,991 MW; Utah, 1,489 MW; Massachusetts, 1,487 
J . 173 (2011) .
135 . U .S . Green Building Council, Green Building Incentive Strategies (2010), 
http://www .slocounty .ca .gov/Assets/PL/Green+Building/Green+Building+ 
Incentive+Strategies .pdf; City of Chicago, Green Permits, http://www .
cityofchicago .org/city/en/depts/bldgs/provdrs/green_permit .html (last vis-
ited May 1, 2017) .
136 . Thaler, supra note 83, at 1143-46 .
137 . David J . Hayes, Leaning on NEPA to Improve the Federal Permitting Process, 
45 ELR 10018 (Jan . 2015), available at http://www .eli .org/sites/default/
files/docs/elrjan .pdf .
138 . American Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, http://
www .awea .org/wind-energy-facts-at-a-glance (last visited May 1, 2017) .
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MW; Georgia, 1,432 MW; Texas, 1,215 MW; and New 
York, 927 MW .139
If Texas were a country, it would have the sixth larg-
est wind-generating capacity in the world .140 The boom in 
wind energy in Texas was certainly not driven by concern 
about climate change; oil and gas continues to be a domi-
nant industry .141 Rather, it stems from a combination of 
favorable economics, good planning, aggressive entrepre-
neurs, and the excellent wind resource enjoyed by much 
of the state . The deregulation of the state’s power sector 
in 1999 under then-Gov . George W . Bush and a Repub-
lican legislature weakened the utilities monopoly and 
introduced competition . The same year, Texas adopted 
a renewable portfolio standard requiring 2,000 MW of 
new renewable energy capacity to be installed statewide 
by 2009 . In 2005, the Texas Legislature raised the goal to 
5,880 MW by 2015 and included a target of 10,000 MW 
by 2025 . The state reached the 10,000 MW target in 2010, 
15 years ahead of schedule .142
The federal production tax credit provided developers 
with an excellent incentive to build wind . Landowners 
were happy to receive income for the use of their land for 
turbines and transmission lines, and counties and school 
boards were pleased by the tax revenues . Everyone liked 
the lower electricity rates and the added jobs . Essential 
to all of this was an action by the legislature in 2005 
creating competitive renewable energy zones (CREZs)—
a $6 .9 billion undertaking, completed to 2014, to build 
transmission lines that take the wind-generated power to 
market . It covers approximately 3,600 miles of right-of-
way and is designed to serve approximately 18,500 MW 
of power .
CREZs are run by the Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas, the state’s grid operator . The availability of these 
lines led to competition to build many wind farms . Since 
Texas is largely isolated electrically from the rest of the 
country, its grid is not subject to regulation by FERC . 
Without federal involvement (other than the subsidies), the 
Texas grid is not subject to NEPA, and Texas has no little 
NEPA law, so EIS are not needed . Offshore wind energy 
and solar energy are also poised to expand rapidly in Texas, 
139 . Solar Energy Industries Association, Top 10 Solar States, http://www .seia .
org/research-resources/top-10-solar-states (last visited May 1, 2017) .
140 . It would be behind China, the United States, Germany, India, and 
Spain, and ahead of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, and 
Brazil . Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Statistics 
2015 (2016), available at http://www .gwec .net/wp-content/uploads/vip/
GWEC-PRstats-2015_LR .pdf .
141 . This account is drawn from Warren Lasher, The Competitive Renewable 
Energy Zones Process, ERCOT, Aug . 11, 2014; Roger Real Drouin, How 
Conservative Texas Took the Lead in U.S. Wind Power, Yale Env’t 360, Apr . 
9, 2015; The Texas Renewable Energy Industry, Texas Wide Open 
for Business (2014); Bill Spindle & Rebecca Smith, Which State Is a 
Big Renewable Energy Pioneer? Texas, Wall St . J ., Aug . 29, 2016; James 
Osborne, As Wind Boom Continues CREZ Capacity in Question, Dallas 
Morning News, Feb . 13, 2015; Mark Del Franco, Nearly Completed CREZ 
Lines Unlock Wind Congestion, N . Am . Windpower (undated) . See also 
Kate Galbraith & Asher Price, The Great Texas Wind Rush: How 
George Bush, Ann Richards, and a Bunch of Tinkerers Helped the 
Oil and Gas State Win the Race to Wind Power (2013) .
142 . Spindle & Smith, supra note 141 .
and additional transmission may have to be built to handle 
this abundance of renewable energy .
Moving to solar, if California were a country, it 
would have the sixth largest generating capacity .143 It has 
nearly one-half of the total installed capacity for solar 
in the United States,144 and the amount of it has been 
growing rapidly . California receives a great deal of sun-
light (insolation), and like everywhere, the costs of PV 
cells have been falling steeply . Unlike Texas, however, 
California is the state that has most fervently supported 
(and acted upon) the fight against climate change, and 
the growth of solar has been driven more by policy than 
by intrinsic economics . Californians tolerate relatively 
high electric rates .
California’s renewable portfolio standard has been an 
important driver of the growth of solar; established in 
2002, it rose from 20% (to be achieved by 2010) in 2006 
to 33% (by 2020) in 2009 to 50% (by 2030) in October 
2015 .145 The growth of rooftop solar has been spurred by 
net metering laws and the Million Solar Roofs Initiative .146 
More than 75,000 workers were employed in the solar 
industry in the state by the end of 2015 .147 As of Septem-
ber 2016, California had 7,350 MW in major solar projects 
in operation and another 27,948 MW in construction or 
under development .148
However, things have not gone as smoothly for central 
station solar plants in California . Solar PV farms require 
permits from local governments, typically county plan-
ning commissions, whereas solar thermal plants must be 
approved by the California Energy Commission, which 
has jurisdiction over power plants that generate 50 MW 
or more of electricity and also use heat to produce elec-
tricity . All these projects must go through California’s 
little NEPA law, the California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA),149 and there is controversy over the extent to 
which CEQA has inhibited the growth of solar in Cali-
fornia .150 In 2008, Gov . Arnold Schwarzenegger signed 
Executive Order No . S-14-08, designed to expedite the 
143 . International Energy Agency, Trends 2015 in Photovoltaic 
Applications 30, tbl . 3 (2015) .
144 . In the first quarter of 2016, there was 27 .5 GWdc in solar operating 
capacity in the United States (PV only) . GTM Research & Solar 
Industries Association, U .S . Solar Market Insight 2016 Q2 
Executive Summary 5 .
145 . California Energy Commission, Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), http://
www .energy .ca .gov/portfolio/ (last visited May 1, 2017) .
146 . Lindsey Hallock & Michelle Kinman, California’s Solar Success Story: 
How the Million Solar Roofs Initiative Transformed the State’s Solar Energy 
Landscape, Env’t Cal ., Apr . 2015 .
147 . Ivan Penn, California Solar Industry Job Growth Reaches Record Levels, L .A . 
Times, Feb . 10, 2016 .
148 . Solar Energy Industries Association, Major Solar Projects in 
the United States Operating, Under Construction, or Under 
Development 2 (updated Sept . 14, 2016) .
149 . Cal . Pub . Res . Code §§21000 et seq .
150 . Sean Hecht, Anti-CEQA Lobbyists Turn to Empirical Analysis, but Are 
Their Conclusions Sound?, Legal Plant, Sept . 28, 2015, http://legal-
planet .org/2015/09/28/anti-ceqa-lobbyists-turn-to-empirical-analysis-but- 
are-their-conclusions-sound/; David Huard, What Is Really Causing Re-
newable Project Failures in California?, Envtl . Leader, May 17, 2011, 
http://www .environmentalleader .com/2011/05/17/what-is-really-causing- 
renewable-project-failures-in-california/ .
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permitting of renewable energy facilities by, among other 
things, creating a more coordinated permitting process 
for projects that must go through the California Energy 
Commission . However, one empirical study found that 
these projects actually take twice as long to be approved 
as those that get county approval .151
Some of these plants have faced considerable litiga-
tion .152 As discussed below, the Ivanpah solar plant faced 
major difficulties due to the ESA . The county approvals 
have become obstacles in some cases; in August 2016, the 
San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors voted not to 
approve the 287-MW Soda Mountain Solar Project, which 
had been approved by BLM, but had drawn widespread 
opposition because of its proximity to the Mojave National 
Preserve and its potential impact on species habitat .153 
Moreover, according to one study, Texas is moving ahead 
of California in building renewable energy because Texas 
has been more stringent in enforcing its renewable portfo-
lio standard, gives a single administrator the power to run 
the renewables program (as opposed to California’s more 
decentralized system), and has done a much better job in 
building needed transmission .154
Some states other than Texas and California have begun 
moving aggressively to increase their renewables capacity . 
As noted above, Iowa is second only to Texas in its installed 
wind capacity . This amount may soon increase consider-
ably; in August 2016, the Iowa Utilities Board approved a 
plan by MidAmerican Energy to erect 1,000 new turbines 
with a total capacity of 2,000 MW on several sites around 
the state at an estimated cost of $3 .6 billion .155 In June 2015, 
Hawaii enacted a law requiring all electric power to come 
from renewables by 2045 .156 In August 2016, the New York 
Public Service Commission approved the Clean Energy 
Standard supported by Governor Cuomo that requires 
50% renewable energy use by the power sector by 2030 .
Most states that have wanted to greatly expand their 
onshore renewable energy capacity have been able to do 
so without great legal difficulty, and many states have 
established processes for approval of renewable facilities .157 
It is seldom necessary to invoke eminent domain for new 
renewable energy generating facilities, as enough landown-
151 . Meaghan Mroz-Barrett, Utility Scale Solar Projects in California: An Initial 
Survey 14 (2015) (M .C .R .P . thesis, California Polytechnic State University), 
http://digitalcommons .calpoly .edu/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article=2535&cont
ext=theses .
152 . Laura Mulry, Green vs. Green: Litigation for and Against Solar Power in 
California, Climate L . Blog, Sabin Center for Climate Change L ., 
May 18, 2011, http://blogs .law .columbia .edu/climatechange/2011/05/18/
green-vs-green-litigation-for-and-against-solar-power-in-california/ .
153 . Louis Sahagun, San Bernardino County Rejects a Controversial Solar Plant 
Proposed for the Mojave Desert, L .A . Times, Aug . 24, 2016; Scott Streater, 
Calif. County Rejects Massive BLM-Approved Project, Greenwire, Aug . 24, 
2016 .
154 . Maria C . Faconti, How Texas Overcame California as a Renewable State: A 
Look at the Texan Renewable Energy Success, 14 Vt . J . Envtl . L . 411 (2013) .
155 . Iowa Utilities Board Approves Huge Wind Energy Project, Des Moines Reg ., 
Aug . 29, 2016 .
156 . H .B . No . 623 (2015) .
157 . Jesse Heibel & Jocelyn Durkay, State Legislative Approaches to Wind Energy 
Facility Siting, Nat’l Conf . of St . Legislatures, Nov . 1, 2016, http://
www .ncsl .org/research/energy/state-wind-energy-siting .aspx .
ers have been willing to lease or sell their land for this pur-
pose, though their neighbors are not always happy .
It is important to distinguish between state attitudes 
and local attitudes toward renewables siting . Most states 
have favored new renewables, but there are exceptions . 
Despite its abundant wind resource, Nebraska has not 
been especially hospitable to wind, partly due to resistance 
from its strong public power industry .158 Connecticut had a 
moratorium on new wind projects from 2011 to 2014 while 
it developed regulations .159 Ohio adopted setback rules in 
2014 that have greatly impeded new wind development .160 
However, these states are the exceptions .
On the other hand, many municipalities have opposed 
wind farms, mostly due to objections from the neighbors, 
and some have used their land use power to stop projects . 
In 48 of the 50 states, local governments have significant 
control over the siting of commercial-scale wind facilities, 
and in 34 states, local governments have substantial auton-
omy to regulate such facilities .161 The ability of states to 
limit local control varies, depending largely on the degree 
of “home rule” that each state’s laws give its municipalities .
Several states have created siting councils to provide 
one-stop (or at least few-stop) procedures for major new 
energy facilities, including renewables; this can reduce 
the hurdles that project developers need to surmount, and 
at a minimum could help ensure that reviews are con-
ducted simultaneously rather than sequentially . Some 
of these councils have the power under various circum-
stances to preempt local governments’ ability to block 
such facilities .162 (Other states’ siting councils, such as the 
California Energy Commission, can only approve thermal 
electric plants .) Some states do not have siting councils, 
but nonetheless have statutes that preempt local control 
over certain renewables .163
The absence of local laws specifically aimed at the sit-
ing of renewable facilities has also inhibited construc-
tion in many places, and in some locations, there are laws 
specifically barring or inhibiting these facilities . Several 
organizations have prepared model wind or solar facility 
158 . Allan M . Williams, The Winds of Change: How Nebraska Law Has Stalled 
the Development of Wind Energy and What Can Be Done to Spur Growth, 47 
Creighton L . Rev . 477 (2013/2014) .
159 . Douglas E . Lamb & Clare M . Lewis, Connecticut’s Moratorium on Wind 
Projects to End?, McGuireWoods LLP, May 1, 2014 .
160 . Dan Gearino, Amazon Official Criticizes Ohio’s Wind Standards in Testimony, 
Columbus Dispatch, May 19, 2016 .
161 . Environmental Law Institute, State Enabling Legislation for 
Commercial-Scale Wind Power Siting and the Local Government 
Role i (2011), available at https://www .eli .org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/
d21-02 .pdf .
162 . Among these are the Washington State Facility Site Evaluation Council; 
the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council; the New York State Board on 
Electric Generation Siting and the Environment; Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission; the Connecticut Siting Council; the New Hampshire Site 
Evaluation Committee; the Vermont Public Service Board; and the Rhode 
Island Facilities Siting Board . See K .K . DuVivier & Thomas Witt, NIMBY 
to Nope—Or YESS?, 38 Cardozo L . Rev . 1453 (2017); Uma Outka, 
Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U . Colo . L . Rev . 927 
(2015); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 
Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 477 (2011) .
163 . Wis . Stat . Ann . §66 .0401; Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 
Wind Turbine Siting Review Procedures (2008) .
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ordinances .164 DOE has posted a catalog of 406 local wind 
energy ordinances .165
Some commentators have suggested enactment of a fed-
eral statute that would allow for preemption of local vetoes 
of renewable energy projects .166 It is not clear if such pre-
emption is needed . As just noted, several states have pre-
emptive power . Municipal disapproval of wind projects was 
becoming a problem in New York,167 so in 2011, the state 
amended the Public Service Law to allow the state siting 
board to preempt such disapprovals for projects of 25 MW 
or greater,168 though smaller projects still face local law 
obstacles .169 Iowa and Texas lack both preemptive power 
and state siting councils, but they nonetheless have led the 
nation in siting new wind facilities . Some proposed facili-
ties have been blocked by local governments, but it is hard 
to tell if this has emerged as a major obstacle to increasing 
national wind and solar generating capacity by central sta-
tion units . In other contexts, federal attempts to preempt 
state or local control over facility siting have backfired and 
have escalated opposition without actually leading to the 
construction of new facilities .170
Recommendations: Many states do not have adequate laws 
and procedures in place to review and approve large-scale 
renewable projects . Those states should emulate the states 
that do have such laws and procedures in place, such as 
California, New York, Oregon, and Washington .171 The 
examples of Iowa and Texas show that special siting coun-
cils may not be essential in expanding construction of 
renewables, but their presence could certainly help smooth 
the way .
A major factor in securing local acceptance is whether 
municipalities and their residents see any benefit from the 
project . In some parts of the country, rental of land for wind 
turbines provides significant income . Business Week head-
lined one story “Wind Is the New Corn: In Some of the 
Poorest Rural Areas in the U .S ., Turbines Are a Fresh Source 
164 . E.g., National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 
Wind Energy & Park Siting and Zoning Best Practices and Guidance 
for States (2012), available at http://pubs .naruc .org/pub/539BA6EE-
2354-D714-5157-359DDD67CE7F; Sabin Center for Climate Change 
Law, http://columbiaclimatelaw .com/resources/model-laws-and-protocols/
model-municipal-ordinances/ . See James M . McElfish Jr . & Sara Gersen, 
Local Standards for Wind Power Siting: A Look at Model Ordinances, 41 ELR 
10825 (Sept . 2011) .
165 . DOE, WINDExchange, http://apps2 .eere .energy .gov/wind/windexchange/
policy/ordinances .asp (last updated Nov . 24, 2015) .
166 . E.g., Garrick B . Pursley & Hannah J . Wiseman, Local Energy, 90 Emory 
L .J . 877 (2011); Melanie McCammon, Environmental Perspectives on Siting 
Wind Farms: Is Greater Federal Control Warranted?, 17 N .Y .U . Envtl . L .J . 
1243 (2009) . See also Amy L . Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 
Conn . L . Rev . 417 (2012) .
167 . See Ecogen, LLC v . Town of Italy, 438 F . Supp . 2d 149 (W .D .N .Y . 2006) 
(upholding municipal moratorium on wind farms) .
168 . Michael B . Gerrard, New York’s Revived Power Plant Siting Law Preempts 
Local Control, N .Y . L .J ., Sept . 8, 2011 .
169 . Steve Orr, D&C Investigation: Big Solar Coming to NYS, Some Are 
Wary, Democrat & Chron ., Nov . 22, 2016, http://www .democrat
andchronicle .com/story/news/2016/11/22/solar-power-energy-new-york- 
upsate/92844228/ .
170 . Michael B . Gerrard, Whose Backyard, Whose Risk: Fear and 
Fairness in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting (MIT Press 1994) .
171 . Thaler, supra note 83, at 1146-47 .
of Wealth .”172 Many towns look for “benefit sharing,” partic-
ularly payments (whether framed as taxes or otherwise) . This 
method has proven successful in the siting of many kinds 
of facilities, such as solid waste landfills, resource recovery 
facilities, and transfer stations . Where the renewable energy 
facilities are to be located in minority communities, pay-
ments from the developers into those communities could 
help reduce environmental justice concerns .
Should local blockage become a major problem, a model 
for overcoming it is provided by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 .173 In the face of major difficulties in siting 
towers for the rapidly growing cellular telephone indus-
try, Congress adopted a statute that left substantive siting 
decisions primarily with local governments, but imposed 
constraints on the approval process they could use . In 
particular, it prevented local governments from banning 
towers entirely, while still allowing localities to determine 
where the towers would go . It imposed time limits on their 
deliberations; if those limits were exceeded, it created a 
federal cause of action allowing the applicants to sue the 
municipalities in federal district court to obtain a speedy 
decision . The municipalities were also required to set forth 
detailed written explanations of any permit denials .174 The 
one substantive restriction is that localities may not regu-
late towers “on the basis of the environmental effects of 
radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facili-
ties comply with [Federal Communications Commission] 
regulations .”175 The statute has proven very successful and 
has supported a tremendous expansion of cellular tele-
phone service .176
Another potential model is the portion of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 pertaining to the siting of liquefied 
natural gas terminals .177 It preempts certain state powers, 
gives special powers to FERC to coordinate federal reviews, 
and expedites judicial review . However, the process has not 
always gone smoothly, as states often resent preemption of 
their powers and may find alternative methods of imped-
ing projects .178
Following the lead of the Telecommunications Act and 
the Energy Policy Act, a federal renewables statute could 
prohibit local governments from banning renewable energy 
facilities, require local governments to make decisions in 
facility siting within a reasonable period of time, require 
that the decisions be made in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence, and create a federal right-of-action 
for applicants to enforce these procedures .179 Most states 
172 . Jennifer Oldham, Wind Is the New Corn, Bus . Wk ., Oct . 16, 2016, at 16 .
173 . 42 U .S .C . §332(c)(7) .
174 . T-Mobile S ., LLC v . City of Roswell, 135 S . Ct . 808 (2015) .
175 . 42 U .S .C . §332(c)(7)(B)(iv) .
176 . Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 
Harv . J . on Legis . 289 (2011) .
177 . Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub . L . No . 109-58, 119 Stat . 594, tit . III, 
amending Natural Gas Act, 15 U .S .C . §717-17w .
178 . See Jacob Dweck et al ., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 Energy 
L .J . 473 (2006); Kenneth T . Kristl, Renewable Energy and Preemption: 
Lessons From Siting LNG Terminals, 23 Nat . Resources & Env’t 58 (2009) .
179 . This concept is discussed in detail in Patricia E . Salkin & Ashira Pelman 
Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving 
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would also have the power to preempt local government 
bans . Whether the federal government or the states would 
be more inclined to adopt such provisions, of course, will 
largely depend on the federal and state politics at the par-
ticular time .
VI. Species Protection Laws
The federal ESA,180 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
(MBTA) of 1918,181 and other statutes designed to protect 
species, especially birds, have become an impediment to 
some utility-scale renewable energy projects, both wind 
and solar . These laws serve extremely important func-
tions in protecting biodiversity and other values, but ways 
must be found to reconcile them with the environmental 
imperative of building a large number of new renewable 
energy facilities .
None of these species protection laws has a “green 
pass”—an exemption for projects that confer other envi-
ronmental benefits .182 Wind turbines can kill birds and 
bats; solar arrays can cover over the habitat of desert crea-
tures; other adverse impacts can occur . This has led to 
tension within the environmental movement between the 
efforts to fight climate change and to protect biodiver-
sity, especially given the scale of renewable energy con-
struction that will be needed . By the time the ESA was 
enacted in 1973, the United States had already built the 
core of its massive national-scale infrastructure systems, 
including the interstate highway system, the Intracoastal 
Waterway, the oil and gas pipeline system, the electric 
power grid, and the major airports . When that infra-
structure was built, rare creatures could be swept away .183 
That is no longer so .
These tensions have inevitably led to a large volume of 
litigation . Most of the suits challenging renewable projects 
because of their species impacts have failed,184 but these 
claims do provide project opponents with legal and politi-
cal ammunition . There appears to have been only one deci-
sion halting a project because of a violation of the ESA . 
That concerned a wind farm in West Virginia that had 
failed to obtain an incidental take permit (a requirement 
discussed below) for its impact on the endangered Indiana 
bat .185 That project later obtained the needed permit and 
went forward, though with some restrictions .186 Several 
other projects were found to violate NEPA because of inad-
Sustainability, 37 Hofstra L . Rev . 1049 (2009) .
180 . 16 U .S .C . §§1531 et seq .
181 . Id . §§703 et seq .
182 . J .B . Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species 
Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 Vand . L . Rev . 1769, 1773 (2012) .
183 . Id . at 1774 .
184 . John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 Notre Dame 
J .L . Ethics & Pub . Pol’y 59 (2013); Lisa Wing Stone & Sara Zdeb, 
Lessons Learned From Wind Farm Litigation, Envtl . Litig . & Toxic Torts 
Committee Newsl . (American Bar Association), Mar . 2009, at 2 . See also 
Renewable Energy Project Challenges—Snapshot of the Litigation Landscape, 
The Lawyer, Nov . 15, 2012 .
185 . Animal Welfare Inst . v . Beech Ridge Energy L .L .C ., 675 F . Supp . 2d 540, 39 
ELR 20278 (D . Md . 2009) .
186 . Gordon Smith, Birds and Bats and Blades, Envtl . F ., May/June 2015, at 36 .
equate analysis of species impacts; all of these were allowed 
to go back and prepare supplemental analysis .187 Similarly, 
the National Historic Preservation Act188 has sometimes 
proven to be a temporary obstacle, especially when Indian 
tribes are involved .189
Several projects in North America have been cancelled 
at least in part due to species issues, including the Palen 
solar project in California,190 a 177-MW wind project on a 
rural area of Saskatchewan, Canada,191 and a wind project 
at an Ohio National Guard base along Lake Erie (though 
this one may come back) .192 Others have been significantly 
reduced in size .193 As discussed elsewhere in this Article, 
species impacts were major issues for the Cape Wind 
project and the Ivanpah solar project . The American Bird 
Conservancy is opposing any and all wind projects in the 
Great Lakes .194
Climate change itself will, of course, cause many spe-
cies to go extinct; the warmer it gets, the more species 
will disappear .195 The Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change reports with “high confidence” that a “large 
fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to 
climate change during and beyond the 21st century, espe-
cially as climate change interacts with other stressors .”196 
One study found that more than one-third of North 
American birds face extinction risk, and climate change 
and sea-level rise are among the main reasons .197 Another 
study classified more than one-half (314 of 588) of North 
187 . Union Neighbors United Inc . v . Jewell, No . 15-5147, 46 ELR 20133 (D .C . 
Cir . Aug . 5, 2016); Public Employees for Envtl . Responsibility v . Hopper, 
No . 14-5301 (D .C . Cir . July 5, 2016); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v . 
Jewell, 823 F .3d 1258 (9th Cir . 2016); Bundorf v . Jewell, 142 F . Supp . 3d 
1138, 45 ELR 20205 (D . Nev . 2015) .
188 . 54 U .S .C . §§300101 et seq .
189 . Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v . U .S . Dep’t of the 
Interior, 755 F . Supp . 2d 1104 (S .D . Cal . 2010) (granting preliminary 
injunction against solar project due to failure to consult with Indian tribe, 
in violation of National Historic Preservation Act) .
190 . End of the Line for the Palen Solar Project, KCET, Feb . 11, 2016; Sammy 
Roth, Palen Solar Project Near Joshua Tree on Life Support, Desert Sun, Dec . 
10, 2015 .
191 . Press Release, Government of Saskatchewan, Wind Energy Project Denied 
to Protect Migratory Birds (Sept . 19, 2016) .
192 . John Seewer, Birders Win Halt to National Guard Wind Turbine, Columbus 
Dispatch, Feb . 9, 2014 .
193 . BLM, Silver State South Project and Las Vegas Field Office Re-
source Management Plan Amendment, Record of Decision (2014); 
BLM, Notice of Availability of the Record of Decision for the Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement and the Proposed Resource Management Plan 
Amendment for the Silver State Solar South Project, Clark County, NV, 79 
Fed . Reg . 9921 (Feb . 21, 2014), available at https://www .gpo .gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2014-02-21/pdf/2014-03685 .pdf . (solar project reduced from 350 
MW to 250 MW, largely due to concerns about desert tortoise); Julie Cart, 
BrightSource Energy Has Spent $56 Million So Far to Protect the Threatened 
Creatures, but Calamities Have Befallen the Effort, L .A . Times, Mar . 4, 2012 
(Ivanpah solar project) .
194 . Press Release, American Bird Conservancy, Wind Turbines on the Great 
Lakes Threaten Migratory Birds (Aug . 5, 2016) . See also Hannah Treppa, 
Not a Huge Fan: Deterring the Implementation of Wind Turbines in the Great 
Lakes, 93 U . Det . Mercy L . Rev . 321 (2016) .
195 . Mark C . Urban, Accelerating Extinction Risk From Climate Change, 348 
Science 571 (2015) .
196 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers 13 .
197 . North American Bird Conservation Initiative, The State of North 
America’s Birds 2016, available at http://www .stateofthebirds .org/2016/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/SoNAB-ENGLISH-web .pdf .
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American bird species as climate-endangered or -threat-
ened in this century .198
The impacts of wind turbines are negligible compared 
to other sources of bird mortality . Far more birds are killed 
by collisions with buildings and communication towers, 
attacks from cats, and poisoning from pesticides .199 One 
study attempted to look at the life cycles of various power 
sources (including coal and uranium mining, fossil fuel 
combustion, etc .) and found that wind farms are respon-
sible for roughly 0 .27 avian fatalities per gigawatt-hour 
(GWh) of electricity, while nuclear power plants involve 
0 .6 fatalities per GWh and fossil fuel-fired power stations 
are responsible for about 9 .4 fatalities per GWh .200
Several portions of the ESA have direct bearing on 
the construction of renewable energy projects . Section 4 
requires species to be listed as endangered or threatened 
based on “the best scientific and commercial data available” 
about the threats posed to their existence, without regard 
to the consequences of listing .201 Section 7 requires that all 
federal agencies “shall  .   .   . insure that any action autho-
rized, funded or carried out by such agency  .  .  . is not likely 
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species .”202 Section 9 provides that 
no one—including private parties—may “take” (defined 
to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect”)203 any such species without a per-
mit .204 Under §10, a permit to modify habitat in a way that 
may “take” protected species may be issued only if the tak-
ing is “incidental” (i .e ., not the purpose of the activity) and 
the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan .205
All central station wind and solar projects fall under 
§9, and unless they involve no onshore or offshore federal 
land or approvals, they will also invoke §7 . Some may also 
involve state laws such as the California Endangered Spe-
cies Act .
Section 7 is set up to deal with one species at a time, and 
§9 one project at a time . Preparing a habitat conservation 
plan under §10, with all the required consultations and 
studies, can take several years and require considerable staff 
time at FWS (the chief agency implementing the ESA) and 
elsewhere . That becomes a real obstacle for a plan to build 
a large number of big renewable energy projects in a fairly 
short period of time .
Prof . J .B . Ruhl, a leading authority on the ESA, wrote 
in 2012, “[A]fter almost ten years of policy development, 
permitting, and litigation, there is still no comprehen-
sive, tested, reliable template for commercial wind power 
198 . National Audubon Society, Audubon’s Birds and Climate Change 
Report 6 (2015), available at http://climate .audubon .org/sites/default/
files/NAS_EXTBIRD_V1 .3_9 .2 .15%20lb .pdf .
199 . Benjamin K . Sovacool, The Avian and Wildlife Costs of Fossil Fuels and 
Nuclear Power, 9 J . Integrative Envtl . Sci . 255, 263 (2012) .
200 . Id .
201 . 16 U .S .C . §1533(b)(1) .
202 . Id . §1536(a)(2) .
203 . Id . §1532(19) .
204 . Id . §1538(a)(1)(B) .
205 . Id . §1539(a)(2) .
to secure expeditious ESA compliance .”206 FWS’ first sig-
nificant step to help wind developers understand what is 
expected of them came in 2003, with issuance of the Interim 
Guidelines to Avoid and Minimize Wildlife Impacts on 
Wind Turbines . In 2012, these were superseded by a much 
more detailed set of land-based wind energy guidelines, 
which were developed in close consultation with the wind 
industry .207 Some progress has been made in accelerating 
the process .
In order to cope with the cumbersome process of pre-
paring habitat conservation plans, and the need to consider 
the cumulative impacts of multiple projects in the same 
area, FWS has been employing regional habitat conser-
vation plans, which allow the environmental assessment 
and wildlife permitting process to occur once for multiple 
species over a large geographic area, merging the NEPA 
and ESA processes . FWS began with three of these .208 The 
Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (for southern 
California) has already been discussed . The Upper Great 
Plains Wind Energy Plan, covering Iowa, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, 
was finalized in July 2016 . It overlaps with the Midwest 
Wind Energy Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Plan, 
which concerns Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin . The draft of that 
plan was released on April 15, 2016, and the comment 
period closed on July 14, 2016 .
These measures should greatly ease the process of build-
ing major wind projects . Each project can rely on the 
regional habitat conservation plan and programmatic EIS, 
and focus just on site-specific issues . Another measure that 
has been found to speed the process is the use of program-
matic biological opinions, in which FWS examines mul-
tiple similar actions or different actions proposed to occur 
within the same area .209
Private governance is also playing a role . In 2008, the 
American Wind Wildlife Institute, a partnership among 
the wind industry, scientific community, and conservation 
organizations, was formed to foster research and develop 
tools to promote timely and responsible wind energy devel-
opment that minimizes impacts to wildlife and wildlife 
habitat . To address specific concerns about bats, the Bat 
Wind Energy Cooperative, a collaboration of the wind 
industry, Bat Conservation International, and DOE, was 
formed in 2003 and has developed various mitigation 
strategies .210 The Nature Conservancy has created the Bio-
diversity and Wind Siting Mapping Tool for New York 
State to help wind developers avoid areas with particular 
ecological vulnerability .
206 . Ruhl, supra note 182, at 1788 .
207 . Id . at 1778-79 .
208 . Id . at 1783 .
209 . Melinda Taylor et al ., Protecting Species or Hindering Energy Development? 
How the Endangered Species Act Impacts Energy Projects on Western Public 
Lands, 46 ELR 10924 (Nov . 2016) .
210 . Taber D . Allison et al ., Thinking Globally and Siting Locally—Renewable 
Energy and Biodiversity in a Rapidly Warming World, 126 Climatic Change 
1, 4 (2014) .
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Some scholars are resisting the idea of speeding up the 
approval process for large wind projects . They argue that 
the ecological risks and uncertainties are still too great, that 
the processes should go more slowly while better informa-
tion is developed, and that more focus should be devoted to 
installing PV on rooftops, disturbed lands, and other less 
environmentally sensitive sites .211 However, it is difficult to 
reconcile these recommendations with the extraordinary 
pace of construction required under the DDPP scenarios .
It is unquestionable that many uncertainties do exist . 
This is illustrated by the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating 
System, the largest concentrating solar plant in the world . 
It is located on 3,500 acres of BLM land in San Bernardino 
County, California, near the Nevada border .212 The private 
developer, BrightSource Energy, Inc ., first filed its applica-
tion in 2007 . It obtained a series of state and federal approv-
als, broke ground in 2010, and began generating power 
in 2014 . It consists of three 459-foot thermal collection 
towers, each surrounded by a field of mirrors—more than 
173,500 in all—that direct sunlight to the towers . Boil-
ers in the towers produce steam that drives conventional 
turbines that generate electricity, with a total capacity of 
377 MW . Much of the attention during the environmental 
review went to an endangered species, the desert tortoise . 
Initial studies assumed that up to 38 tortoises lived on the 
project site and would need to be relocated during con-
struction . However, once construction began, it became 
clear that far more tortoises lived there . Construction 
stopped while FWS prepared a new biological opinion and 
issued a new incidental take permit . Numerous measures 
to minimize and monitor impacts were adopted . The proj-
ect also needed to acquire and permanently preserve more 
than 7,000 acres of off-site habitat for desert tortoises and 
other species .
After the plant opened, an unanticipated phenomenon 
occurred . In the words of Morgan Walton:
[L]ocal observers noticed “smoke plume[s]” in the air when 
birds flew through the concentrated sun rays reflected off 
of the mirrors . The workers called these birds “streamers” 
for the image they created as the animals spontaneously 
ignited in midair and hurtled to the ground in a smoking, 
smoldering ball . These deaths are not isolated incidents 
where only a few stray birds—reports estimate that over 
3,500 birds have experienced a similar fate during the 
plant’s first year, although the exact number is a subject 
of debate .213
211 . Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable 
Energy Gold Rush, 15 Minn . J .L . Sci . & Tech . 293 (2014); Kalyani 
Robbins, Responsible, Renewable, and Redesigned: How the Renewable Energy 
Movement Can Make Peace With the Endangered Species Act, 15 Minn . J .L . 
Sci . & Tech . 555 (2014) .
212 . This account is drawn from Morris & Owley, supra note 211; Morgan 
Walton, A Lesson From Icarus: How the Mandate for Rapid Solar Development 
Has Singed a Few Feathers, 40 Vt . L . Rev . 131 (2015); and BrightSource, 
Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (2014), available at http://
www .brightsourceenergy .com/stuff/contentmgr/files/0/3eac1a9fed7f13fe40
06aaab8c088277/attachment/ivanpah_white_paper_0414 .pdf .
213 . Walton, supra note 212, at 132 (citations omitted) .
As this is written in June 2017, a technical solution 
has not been announced, and the regulatory implications 
remain unclear .214 Also unclear is the future of concentrat-
ing solar power—partly because of the Ivanpah experience, 
and more importantly because of the plummeting cost of 
PV cells, and their lower water consumption .
When species impacts are anticipated (even if very 
imperfectly, as with Ivanpah), the first preference is to 
avoid or at least reduce them, and to the extent that 
some remain, mitigate them, which often involves find-
ing substitute habitat . This is a tricky process, in part 
because of the scientific uncertainty about how various 
species will be affected, and whether and how long they 
would thrive in other locations, especially in a changing 
climate . DOI is trying to inject these issues into early 
project planning and to strengthen the scientific basis for 
decisionmaking .215
In addition to the ESA, two other federal statutes 
contribute to challenges in siting utility-scale renewable 
energy facilities . The first is the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act (MBTA),216 which makes it a criminal offense to kill a 
migratory bird “by any means, or in any manner .” In 2001, 
President Bill Clinton signed an Executive Order clarify-
ing that this applies to unintentional as well as intentional 
killing .217 The MBTA currently covers more than 1,000 
bird species . In two instances, wind facility operators were 
charged with violating this law . In 2013, Duke Energy 
Renewables, Inc . was prosecuted for the deaths of 14 golden 
eagles and 149 other protected birds at two wind projects in 
Wyoming . In 2014, PacifiCorp Energy was charged in the 
deaths of 38 golden eagles and 336 migratory birds at other 
facilities in Wyoming . Both companies pled guilty, paid 
substantial fines, and agreed to costly compliance plans . It 
appears that neither company followed FWS guidance that 
was in effect at the time .218
These prosecutions have led to some anxiety in the wind 
industry . However, there is a solution . The MBTA gives the 
Secretary of the Interior the authority to issue incidental 
take permits, but unlike for the ESA or the eagle law (dis-
cussed below), the secretary has not established procedures 
to issue such permits under the MBTA . Thus, wind farm 
operators cannot be sure that they are operating legally if 
birds die in their turbines, and they can be somewhat but 
not absolutely certain that they will not be prosecuted if 
they follow the guidelines . As several commentators have 
already urged, the secretary should use this authority and 
promulgate regulations for the issuance of incidental take 
214 . Louis Sahagun, This Mojave Desert Solar Plant Kills 6,000 Birds a Year. Here’s 
Why That Won’t Change Any Time Soon, L .A . Times, Sept . 2, 2016 .
215 . Hayes, supra note 54; FWS, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants: Endangered Species Act Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed . 
Reg . 95316 (Dec . 27, 2016); Morris & Owley, supra note 211 .
216 . 16 U .S .C . §§703-712 .
217 . Exec . Order No . 13186, 66 Fed . Reg . 3853 (Jan . 17, 2001), Responsibilities 
of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds .
218 . Cassie Tigue, Wind Energy Development and Protection of Wildlife: Creating 
a Balance Between Two Competing Interests, 45 Tex . Envtl . L .J . 223 (2015); 
Smith, supra note 186, at 36; Alan Kovski, Cooperative Efforts Encouraged 
to Reduce Risk of Wind Farm Bird Deaths, Legal Action, Daily Env’t Rep . 
(BNA), Dec . 3, 2013, at A-9 .
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permits under the MBTA, coupled with whatever require-
ments are necessary to minimize bird deaths .219
The other relevant statute is the Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act of 1940 .220 It bars the taking of either of 
these kinds of birds, but it allows FWS to issue permits for 
such taking . In 2009, FWS issued regulations authorizing 
issuance of permits for the taking of eagles . These permits 
would have a maximum term of five years . In 2013, partly 
to encourage new wind farms, FWS amended its regula-
tions to extend the maximum term of permits to 30 years . 
Conservation groups were unhappy with this extension, 
and they sued . In 2015, a court invalidated the rule because 
FWS had not complied with NEPA in promulgating it; 
FWS should have prepared an environmental assessment 
or an EIS .221 FWS then went back, prepared a program-
matic EIS, and in December 2016, it published a final rule 
that extended the permit term to 30 years and also added 
more stringent conservation standards and more flexible 
mitigation requirements for permits .222
Recommendations: Professor Ruhl has made the following 
sensible recommendations for improving the ESA process 
for the review of renewable projects223:
1 . FWS should enhance species impact databases 
and standardized metrics for take assessment . 
This would ease the process of evaluating projects’ 
impacts on species .
2 . After appropriate review, FWS should consider 
endorsing the work product of outside entities, such 
as the landscape assessment tool produced by the 
American Wind and Wildlife Institute . This would 
provide greater clarity and specificity to all par-
ties—government agencies, applicants, and envi-
ronmental groups—in assessing project impacts 
and identifying optimal siting .
3 . FWS could develop standard methodologies for 
mitigation of harms from particular kinds of utility-
scale projects, drawing from a wide set of mitigation 
options and recipes including habitat conservation 
banks and payment formulae .224
219 . Robert J . Martin & Rob Ballard, Reconciling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
With Expanding Wind Energy to Keep Big Wheels Turning and Endangered 
Birds Flying, 20 Animal L . 145 (2013); Krisztina Nadasdy, Killing Two Birds 
With One Stone: How an Incidental Take Permit Program Under the MBTA 
Can Help Companies and Migratory Birds, 41 B .C . Envtl . Aff . L . Rev . 167 
(2014) .
220 . 16 U .S .C . §§668-668d .
221 . Shearwater v . Ashe, No . 14-CV-02830-LHK, 45 ELR 20151 (N .D . Cal . 
Aug . 11, 2015) .
222 . FWS, Eagle Permits; Revisions to Regulations for Eagle Incidental Take and 
Take of Eagle Nests, 81 Fed . Reg . 91494 (Dec . 16, 2016); S . Keith Garner, 
FWS Proposes, Again, to Issue 30-Year Eagle Act Permits, Law360, June 21, 
2016; Ankur K . Tohan et al ., Eagle Take Permit Program Revamped—Longer 
Permits and Clearer Mitigation Requirements, K&L Gates, May 23, 2016 .
223 . Ruhl, supra note 182, at 1796-98 .
224 . See Elinor Benami et al ., Stanford Law School, Comments and 
Recommendations for the Steering Committee on Federal 
Infrastructure Permitting and Review Process Improvement and 
the President’s Chief Performance Officer, Director of OIRA, and 
Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (2013), available 
4 . FWS should consider the positive environmental 
impact of renewable energy in granting mitigation 
credit under the §10 process,225 and all federal agen-
cies should consider these positive impacts in mak-
ing decisions under NEPA .
These are additional specific actions that should be 
taken:
1 . FWS should use its existing authority to issue 
incidental take permits under the MBTA so that 
renewable project operators do not face criminal 
prosecution if they take required precautions but 
nonetheless some birds die .
2 . The president should issue an Executive Order, or 
the Secretary of the Interior should issue a depart-
mental order, imposing time limitations (subject to 
limited extensions for good cause) for the ESA §10 
incidental take permit process and consider other 
ways to make the process more efficient .
3 . FWS should expand types of compensatory mitiga-
tion allowed for renewable energy project impacts 
on wildlife . Some examples of compensation for 
offshore wind projects, for example, could include 
protecting or expanding existing breeding habitat, 
such as seabird nesting islands; reducing mortality 
of adults of long-lived species, such as in marine 
mammal boat collisions or fisheries bycatch (birds, 
sea turtle, nontarget vulnerable fish species); and 
controlling pollutants, such as mercury, that reduce 
reproductive success .226
4 . FWS and the U .S . Department of Justice should 
negotiate agreements with project applicants mak-
ing clear that no enforcement actions will be taken 
against any renewable projects that fulfill specified 
protective measures .227
5 . FWS, the scientific community, and the wind 
industry should continue to develop techniques to 
reduce bird and bat mortality from wind turbines . 
The most prominent techniques so far involve 
at https://www-cdn .law .stanford .edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/WH-
Comments-Final1-Permitting .pdf .
225 . Several provisions in ESA §10 could provide support for this measure . These 
include the requirement that “the impact which will likely result from such 
taking” (§10(a)(2)(A)(i)) be considered, which does not limit consideration 
to local and immediate as opposed to global and cumulative impacts; that 
“alternative actions to such taking” (§10(a)(2)(A)(iii)) be considered, which 
should allow a broad review of the methods of reducing emissions from the 
energy sector; and the necessary finding that “the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild” 
(§10(a)(2)(B)(iv)), which could also allow consideration of large-scale 
impacts of renewable energy .
226 . M . Wing Goodale & Anita Milman, Cumulative Adverse Effects of Offshore 
Wind Energy Development on Wildlife, 59 J . Envtl . Plan . & Mgmt . 1, 12 
(2016) .
227 . FWS did this in 2014 with EDF Renewable Energy . Andrew Bell, A 
New Approach by USFWS Over Wind Energy Avian Issues, Marten L ., 
Jan . 21, 2016 . See also The Edison Electric Institute’s Avian Power 
Line Interaction Committee & FWS, Avian Protection Plan (APP) 
Guidelines (2005), available at http://www .aplic .org/uploads/files/2634/
APPguidelines_final-draft_Aprl2005 .pdf .
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reducing turbine speed; turning them on only when 
wind speed is above a certain level; and turning 
them off during migration periods . Research should 
also continue on new technologies such as vertical-
axis turbines (which spin around a central axis like a 
top), and ultrasonic acoustic systems and ultraviolet 
lights that deter bats . Use of some of these tech-
niques and technologies will presumably come to be 
required by the permits for wind facilities .
In view of the serious obstacles that the ESA has posed 
to renewable projects, should the day come when we have 
a Congress that wants to preserve the ESA’s essential values 
but wishes to promote aggressive construction of renew-
able facilities, it should consider creating an easier path 
under §§7 and 10 for renewable projects that have met cer-
tain tightly defined conditions, such as thorough habitat 
studies, adoption of all reasonable mitigation measures, 
and utilization of any available technologies and tech-
niques to minimize impacts . This might include special 
provisions reducing the impediments to renewables caused 
by certain species, such as the Indiana bat . As Taber D . 
Allison and colleagues have written: “We argue the need 
to accept some and perhaps substantial risk of impacts to 
wildlife from renewable energy development in order to 
limit the far greater risks to biodiversity loss owing to cli-
mate change .”228
VII. Needed Complementary Actions
This Article has discussed the legal obstacles to the con-
struction of large numbers of central station wind and solar 
generating facilities, focusing on the facilities themselves . 
However, many other actions must take place in order for 
this to happen .
A. Grid Connection and Integration
As already noted several times, central station generators 
must be connected to the load they serve . This may involve 
running new power lines shorter or longer distances to 
the nearest suitable grid connection, and it may require 
upgrading the existing lines to handle the electricity sup-
plied by the new renewable energy source .
It is not just a matter of plugging wires into the exist-
ing grid . The grid is a complex, finely tuned instrument, 
and its proprietors (in many parts of the country, these 
are regional transmission operators or independent system 
operators) require a close examination to make sure the 
new inflow of electrons will not disrupt the system . The 
grid operators often have long queues of potential generat-
ing units seeking access, and it can take many months and 
extensive studies to gain interconnection approval .
This is greatly complicated by the fact that the wind 
does not always blow and the sun does not always shine . 
This intermittency is one of the major impediments to 
228 . Allison et al ., supra note 210, at 1 .
broader use of wind and solar power . Several techniques 
are being developed to solve this problem . All manner of 
storage technologies are being developed and improved 
so that electricity generated during off-peak times can be 
used during peaks . Demand-response programs can lower 
demand during traditional peak times . Improved transmis-
sion lines and “smart grid” techniques allow electricity to 
be furnished from more distant locations where, for exam-
ple, the wind may be blowing . Information technologies 
allow better balancing of supply and demand, especially 
over large areas, calling on various resources to take up the 
slack left by a lack of wind or sun . New meteorological 
techniques can improve wind prediction, allowing adjust-
ments to be made in advance . If all else fails, the power 
lost because of darkness or still winds can be made up by 
backup fossil fuel generators, ideally with carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) .229
B. Subsidies and Incentives
Between 2008 and 2015, the average cost of build-
ing capacity for land-based wind in the United States 
decreased by 41%, that of distributed PV by 54%, and 
that of utility-scale PV by 64% .230 Though the plummet-
ing costs of renewables, especially PV, are changing the 
situation, renewables have typically been more expensive 
than conventional fossil fuel sources, and subsidies or other 
incentives or requirements are necessary to induce the con-
struction of new renewable capacity . Once built, however, 
renewables benefit from the absence of fuel costs and of 
their attendant volatility .
C. Land Allocation
The impacts of climate change, and efforts to fight it, will 
lead to several massive demands for land in addition to the 
siting of large wind and solar projects and associated trans-
mission lines:
•	 The growing of bioenergy crops as a substitute for 
fossil fuels .
•	 The growing of crops for bioenergy CCS as a way of 
removing carbon dioxide from the air .
•	 The loss of habitable or arable land due to sea-level 
rise and drought, and the relocation of activities from 
that land to other locations .
•	 The set-aside of large areas of land, as some have 
proposed, for habitat for species that are threatened 
229 . For additional information on the challenges of integrating renewables 
into the grid, see International Energy Agency & Clean Energy 
Ministerial, Next Generation Wind and Solar Power: From Cost to 
Value (2016) [hereinafter Next Generation Wind and Solar Power] .
230 . DOE, Revolution  .  .  . Now: The Future Arrives for Five Clean Energy 
Technologies—2016 Update 1 (2016) . See also Next Generation Wind 
and Solar Power, supra note 229, at 6; Mark Bolinger & Joachim Seel, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Utility-Scale Solar 2015: 
An Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing 
Trends in the United States (2016) .
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by climate change and all manner of other human-
caused threats .231
On top of this are globally massive demands for 
land to grow food for rising populations, and espe-
cially land to grow feed for animals to be consumed by 
the increasingly affluent residents of some developing 
countries, chiefly China . This is leading to many large- 
scale land acquisitions .232
Some land can simultaneously be used for several pur-
poses . For example, the piers for wind turbines occupy very 
little land, and farming can continue below and around 
the turbines . As discussed below, solar panels can be put 
on buildings and on contaminated and otherwise unusable 
land . However, solar farms in a desert occupy most of the 
land under their large footprints .
No procedure or institution is in place, either domes-
tically or globally, to balance these competing uses for 
large quantities of land . The federal government employs 
a variety of management approaches to address compet-
ing use demands for its large landholdings, with mixed 
results .233 In December 2016, BLM adopted what it called 
the Planning 2 .0 rule to facilitate large-scale planning of 
its immense landholdings in the western states,234 but in 
March 2017, President Trump signed a bill adopted under 
the Congressional Review Act repealing this rule .235 With 
the exception of the western states, however, states, local 
governments, and private parties are the principal land-
owners and there are few resources or inclinations by those 
entities to look more broadly at regional or national needs 
for land . We have an ungoverned patchwork that is not 
well-suited to deal with the unfortunate fact that wind and 
solar require much more land than fossil fuel or nuclear 
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(2016) .
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energy per unit of energy produced, though much less 
than biofuels .236
Prof . Uma Outka has identified five policy objectives 
for addressing and reducing the cumulative impacts of the 
demands for land created by renewable energy .237 All five, 
listed in her order of priority, are:
1 . Avoid new infrastructure/new land impacts (which 
can be advanced by energy-efficiency measures that 
reduce the need for new energy infrastructure) .
2 . Reuse land that has already been developed or oth-
erwise disturbed .
3 . Maximize land-efficient onsite and local energy 
potential .
4 . Identify early the least-harm sites for energy proj-
ects and strengthen mitigation measures for facili-
ties we need .
5 . Link transmission planning and renewable energy 
policy more closely .
VIII. Conclusion
The task of building the enormous number of new util-
ity-scale renewable energy facilities required to meet the 
DDPP goals is daunting indeed . It will require strong 
and unyielding commitment by the federal government 
and the states, and willingness to recognize the tradeoffs 
involved in selectively relaxing some cherished regulatory 
restrictions on new construction that have been shown to 
interfere with the construction efforts that are essential to 
prevent the worst impacts of climate change .
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